A Study of Financial Performance Appraisal of Life Insurance Corporation of India by Bhatt, Shilpa R.
          Saurashtra University 
     Re – Accredited Grade ‘B’ by NAAC 
     (CGPA 2.93) 
 
 
 
 
Bhatt, Shilpa R., 2012, “A Study of Financial Performance Appraisal of Life 
Insurance Corporation of India”,  thesis PhD, Saurashtra University 
  
http://etheses.saurashtrauniversity.edu/id/eprint/609 
  
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author. 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, 
awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Saurashtra University Theses Service 
http://etheses.saurashtrauniversity.edu 
repository@sauuni.ernet.in 
 
© The Author 
CERTIFICATE 
 
Dr. Kamlesh M. Jani, 
Principal, 
Shree Popatlal Dhanjibhai Malaviya College of Commerce, 
Rajkot-360 004. 
 
This is to certify that Ms Shilpa Ravindra Bhatt has completed Thesis on    
“A Study of Financial Performance Appraisal of Life Insurance 
Corporation of India” under my guidance. The work carried out regarding 
this thesis has not been presented to any university for any designation or for 
any educational qualification before. 
 
 
Dr. Kamlesh M. Jani 
 
Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
Ms. Shilpa R. Bhatt 
Lecturer, 
Shree G.H.Gosrani Commerce & D.D.Nagda B.B.A. college, 
Indira Gandhi Marg, 
Near Gokul Nagar, Behind Kailash Nagar, 
Jamnagar - 361 004 
 
Here by, I declare that I, Ms. Shilpa Ravindra Bhatt undersigned have 
registered  as a student of Ph.D. in the Faculty of Commerce, Saurashtra 
University, Rajkot  on  31-07-2008    with registration no 
3978. The thesis on “A Study of Financial Performance Appraisal of Life 
Insurance Corporation of India” is my own research work and I have 
prepared it under the guidance of   Dr. Kamlesh M. Jani, Principal, Shree 
Popatlal Dhanjibhai Malaviya College of Commerce, Rajkot. This thesis has 
not been presented to any university for any designation or for any 
educational qualification. 
 
 
Shilpa R. Bhatt 
 
 
Date:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
This research work is deliberate efforts of many people who contributed in 
one or the other way. I sincerely thank to all of them. 
I must sincerely acknowledge that this research work would not have been 
possible without kind and active guidance from my respected Ph.D. Guide Dr. 
Kamlesh M.Jani. I have no words to thank him for all the valuable and 
precious time he has spared for helping me to carry out this work. At this 
juncture, I express my sincere gratitude and thanks for his constant inspiration 
and motivation at every stage of research. 
I would like to thank all those who have helped me directly or indirectly in 
carrying out this research work. . 
 
 
Thanks, 
 
Shilpa R. Bhatt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I N D E X 
 
Chapter Details Page No. 
01 INSURANCE INDUSTRY : AN OVERVIEW 001  To   044 
 1.1 INSURANCE INDUSTRY : AN  OVERVIEW 001 To 009 
  1.1.1 History of Insurance Sector 001 To 005 
  1.1.2 Challenges affecting global Insurance 006 To 009 
   1 Climate change 006 To 006 
   2 Demographic change 006 To 007 
   3 Emerging markets 007 To 007 
   4 Regulatory intervention 007 To 008 
   5 Distribution channels 008 To 008 
   6 Legal risks 008 To 009 
 1.2 America 009 To 011 
  1.2.1. Some challenges 010 To 011 
 1.3 Europe 011 To 013 
 1.4 Asia Pacific Region 013 To 016 
 1.5 India 016 To 018 
 1.6 Insurance Sector Reforms 019 To 021 
  1.6.1 Structure 019 To 019 
  1.6.2 Competition 020 To 020 
  1.6.3 Regulatory body 020 To 020 
  1.6.4 Investments 020 To 020 
  1.6.5 Customer services 021 To 021 
 1.7 Life Insurance Corporation of India 021 To 044 
  1.7.1 Aims of LIC 022 To 022 
  1.7.2 Important functions of LIC 022 To 024 
  1.7.3 Organization structure of LIC 025 To 025 
  1.7.4 Plans of LIC 026 To 027 
  1.7.5 Role of LIC in national economy 027 To 044 
   1.7.5.1 Investment 028 To 028 
   1.7.5.2 Underwriting 028 To 028 
   1.7.5.3 Disbursing loans 028 To 029 
   1.7.5.4 Share holding 029 To 029 
   1.7.5.5 Claims & settlement 029 To 030 
   1.7.5.6 Subscribing to debentures & bonds 030 To 030 
   1.7.5.7 Mutual fund 030 To 030 
Chapter Details Page No. 
   1.7.5.8 Boosting industrial growth 031 To 031 
   1.7.5.9 Socially oriented 031 To 032 
02 LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA : PRE AND POST 
LIBERALIZATION 
045 To 121 
 2.1 Introduction 045 To 046 
 2.2 Evolution of Insurance: Insurance in the Colonial Era.  047 To 050 
 2.3 Insurance Act 1938 050 To 053 
  2.3.1 Mortality Tables 053 To 054 
 2.4 Evolution of Insurance during Nationalized Era: 1956 -
2000: Rationale for Nationalization 
055 To 065 
 2.5 Rural Insurance 066 To 069 
 2.6
  
Prelude to nationalization of general insurance: Birth of 
the Tariff Advisory Committee 
069 To 073 
 2.7 Nationalization of General insurance.  074 To 076 
 2.8 Investment Regimes: Before and after nationalization. 076 To 080 
 2.9 Life Insurance Business during Nationalized Era 080 To 088 
 2.10 Introduction of the New Legal Structure  089 To 089 
 2.11 Features of Insurance Regulatory and Development Act 090 To 093 
 2.12 Current Business Environment 094 To 094 
 2.13 Market Driven Factors 094 To 096 
 2.14 Regulation Driven Factors 096 To 096 
 2.15 Impact of Governmental Reforms 2000 097 To 098 
 2.16 Distribution Channels 098 To 099 
 2.17 Reinsurance 099 To 100 
 2.18 Market Share 100 To 107 
 2.19 Insurance in the Rural Sector 107 To 108 
 2.20 Price Dispersion of Life Insurance Products 108 To  110 
 2.21 Future Prospects : Market Size 110 To 116 
 2.22 References 117  to  123 
03 REVIEW OF LITERATURE 124 To 156 
04 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 157 To  165 
 4.1 Introduction 157 To 158 
 4.2 Review of Literature 158 To 159 
 4.3 The Title of the Research Problem 160 To 160 
 4.4 Research Problem 160 To 160 
 4.5 Hypothesis 160 To 161 
 4.6 Sources of Data 161 To 161 
 4.7 Method of Data Collection 162 To 162 
Chapter Details Page No. 
 4.8 Chapter Plan 162 To 162 
 4.9 Significance of the Study 162 To 163 
 4.10 Limitations of the Study 163 To 163 
 4.11 References 164 To 165 
05 ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY DATA 166 To 234 
 5.1 LIFE INSURANCE : AT A GLANCE 166 To 167 
 5.2 Development of Insurance after Independence : 1956 
to 2000 
167 To 234 
  5.2.1 Need for Nationalization 167 To 172 
  5.2.2 Inception of Tariff Advisory 
Committee 
172 To 174 
  5.2.3 Investment: Before and After 
Nationalization 
174 To 175 
  5.2.4 Life Insurance Business before 
globalization 
175 To 180 
  5.2.5 General Insurance: Malhotra 
committee report 
181 To 182 
  5.2.6 New Legal Structure and Life 
Insurance in India 
182 To 183 
  5.2.7 Features of the Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Act  
184 To 188 
  5.2.8 Development of insurance after 
Liberazation 
189 To 200 
  5.2.9 IRDA : Current state of play & future 
prospects  
200 To 203 
  5.2.10 Life  Insurance & it distribution 
channels 
 
204 To 204 
  5.2.11 Reinsurance : 205 To 206 
  5.2.12 Life insurance : Market share of 
players 
206 
 
To 208 
  5.2.13 Investment  in Insurance & Legal 
Implications 
209 To 213 
  5.2.14 Price dispersion of life Insurance 
products 
213 To 216 
  5.2.15 Indian Insurance Market : future 217 To 220 
Chapter Details Page No. 
perspective 
  5.2.16 Future prospects: Market share 220 To 222 
  5.2.17 Findings 222 To 223 
  5.2.18 References 223 To 227 
  5.2.19 Appendix 1: definitions of various 
lines of business in the insurance act 
of 1938 
228 TO 234 
06 FINDINGS & SUGGESTION 235 To 241 
 6.1 Findings 235 To 238 
 6.2 Suggestions 239 To 241 
 
 
  
Page  1  
  
CHAPTER – I 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW  
 
1.1 Insurance Industry : An Overview 
1.1.1.History of Insurance Sector-: 
The roots of Insurance might be traced to Babylonia, where 
traders were encouraged to assume the risks of caravan trade 
through loans that were repaid only after the goods have arrived 
safely. 
With the growth of towns and trade in Europe, the medieval 
guilds undertook to protect their members from loss of fire and 
shipwreck, to ransom them from captivity by pirates, and to 
provide decent burial and support in sickness and poverty. By 
the middle of the 14th century, as evidenced by the earliest 
known Insurance contract (GENOA 1347), marine insurance 
was practically universal among the maritime nations of 
Europe. In London Lioyd’s Coffee House (1688) was a place 
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where merchants, ship owners and underwriters met to transect 
business. By the end of the 18th century Lioyd’s had progressed 
into one of the first modern Insurance companies. 
Insurance developed rapidly with the growth of British 
commerce in the 17th and 18th century. Prior to the formation of 
corporation devoted solely to the business of writing Insurance, 
policies were signed by a number of individuals each of whom 
who wrote his name and the amount of risk he was assuming 
underneath the insurance proposal. The first stock companies to 
engage in insurance sector were Charter in England in 1720, 
and in 1735 the first Insurance Company in the American 
colonies was founded at Charleston, S.C. Fire Insurance 
Corporation were formed in New York city (1787) and in 
Philadelphia (1794). The Presbyterian Synod of Philadelphia 
sponsored (1759) the first life insurance corporation in 
America. 
In the 19th century many friendly or benefit societies were 
founded to insure the life and health of their members, many 
employer sponsored group insurance policies for their 
employees such policies generally include not only life 
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insurance but sickness and accident benefits, old age pensions, 
and the employee contributed certain percentage of premium. 
Since the late 19th century there has been a growing tendency 
for the state to enter the field of insurance, especially with 
respect to safeguarding workers against sickness and disability, 
either temporary or permanent, destitute, old age and 
unemployment. The U.S. government has also experimented 
with various types of crop insurance, a land mark in this field 
being the Federal Crop Insurance Act Of 1938. In World War II 
the government provided life insurance for members of the 
armed forces, since then it has provided other forms of 
insurance such as pensions for veterans and for government 
employees. 
Insurance awareness has led people to save in policyholders’ 
and pensioners’ funds in financial markets, which thereby not 
only protect them, but also lead to overall development of the 
country. Countries with a robust insurance sector, higher capital 
base and more diverse products deem to have generated long 
term funds for investment in their debt and capital markets. 
Further, it has been observed that these countries have also 
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released resources for investment, particularly for the 
infrastructure sector. 
With a relatively young and well educated population of 
1.1billion people, the insurance market in India appears more 
than favorable and can generate sufficient long-term funds for 
the development. The domestic insurance industry has been 
growing at a CAGR of 28.1% during FY03-07 with the entry of 
many new players — both domestic and foreign, formulation of 
new regulations and the introduction of newer products. 
The emergence of segments such as health insurance and micro 
insurance has opened new growth avenues for specialized 
services. But still there are gaps such as concerns over product, 
distribution and penetration (India’s penetration was only 0.6% 
of GDP in FY07, as compared to 2.7% in Australia and 3.8% in 
South Korea during the same period), which need to be 
addressed. Hence, there is an unfinished agenda on the reforms 
and industry compliance front, particularly in terms of 
exploring alternative ways to manage and oversee both risk and 
capital management issues in the insurance industry in India.  
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Accordingly, in order to achieve exponential growth in various 
segments of insurance, the need to view the present state and 
future course of action has becomes imperative. This will play a 
crucial role in setting the right expectations, learning from the 
experience of other countries as well as delineating strategies, 
thereby positioning India as a regional insurance hub and an 
international financial center.  
The global insurance industry is facing increasing competition, 
which has put significant pressure on companies to become 
more efficient, enhance their technology-related processes and 
alter their business models.  
Globally, most insurance companies are trying to enhance the 
efficiency of their underwriting process, cut their overheads and 
reduce claims leakage since returns from investment are 
shrinking. Net operating gains in the insurance sector are 
expected to increase globally in 2008. With high competition in 
the insurance industry, companies will need to strengthen their 
product lines, investment strategies and corporate infrastructure. 
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1.1.2.Challenges Affecting Global Insurance: 
The following have been identified as challenges that may 
affect the global insurance industry in 2008. 
1.  Climate change: Climatic changes due to global 
warming have increased windstorms, floods and heat 
waves. These result in an increase in mortality and health 
problems, the spread of environment-related litigation 
and political risk linked to conflicts for control of 
resources. Climate changes can affect an insurance 
company’s pricing structure, solvency and corporate 
viability. 
2.  Demographic change: The proportion of the population 
over the age of 60 years is expected to rise from 20% in 
2005 to 33% in 2050 worldwide, increasing the demand 
for financial products to meet post-retirement needs. 
Moreover, estimates suggest that around 10,000 people 
will become eligible for social security Indian insurance 
industry:  Hence, insurance companies are stepping in as 
social welfare providers. 
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3.  Emerging markets: Most companies grow organically 
to meet their strategic objective of being global players, 
but insurers face a challenge in developing cultural 
knowledge (for product design and sales) and effective 
distribution channels. Russia, China and India are among 
the countries where local insurers have been more 
successful than in other countries. 
4.  Regulatory intervention: The shift from rule-based to 
principal-based regulations has increased regulatory 
scrutiny, the complexity of rules and sophisticated 
underlying methods of insurance business. Regulatory 
changes include the International Financial Reporting 
Standard, Sarbanes-Oxley, the proposed adoption of 
Solvency II norms in the UK, principal-based reserves in 
the US, among others. These regulations are driven by 
political factors and can result in a change in 
underwriting practices and the selection criteria. 
5.  Distribution channels: Technological advancements are 
edging out traditional agent based distribution models. 
Today,insurance companies are reaching their clients 
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directly, either through phone or via  internet. However, 
insurance brokers and intermediaries are still preferred 
channels for selling commercial lines and complex 
products. Therefore, insurance companies need to look 
for innovative distribution channels.  
6.  Legal risks: Significant and unexpected changes in the 
legal environment can result in serious implications for 
the insurance business. These changes can be either 
through government legislations or case law decisions. 
To remain competitive, insurance companies are 
concentrating on upgrading their products, developing 
new ways to manage and oversee risk and capital 
management, and formulate new regulations that may 
revolutionize the industry in the next decade. The 
following section illustrates the insurance scenario of the 
three most important geographic regions of the world. 
1.2 America 
The insurance market in the US is currently in its best phase, since US 
property/casualty insurers are expected to record net profits for the third 
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consecutive year. The industry’s profitability is related to a favorable 
insurance pricing environment that began in 2002. 
A favorable claims experience and comparatively benign catastrophe 
situations have considerably improved accident and healthcare operational 
earnings. Operating earnings also benefited from the improved mortality 
experience in the traditional life and reinsurance lines. However, sales of 
fixed income annuities have been affected by difficult market conditions 
associated with uncertainty over the regulatory environment. New business 
margins for some insurers fell, partly due to the effect of rising interest 
yields, which resulted in a higher discounting of future profits. However, 
insurers with innovative product offerings within variable annuities have 
showed a stronger performance.  
 
 
1.2.1. Some challenges 
• Insurance companies face increasing complexity in the 
highly regulated and reporting environment of the US. 
Lawsuits, regulations and quasi-regulatory issues are still 
a concern for insurers/distributors as they increase 
uncertainty in the industry. Some key regulatory issues 
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include international supervision, US regulation of 
primary insurers, the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley 
processes, and the extension of the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act (TRIA). 
• Most insurers now sell their products via unaffiliated 
distributors, including banks, broker/dealers, insurance 
brokers and independent marketing organizations. To 
maintain their market position and sales without resorting 
to aggressive pricing, life insurers need to manage 
distribution relationships and compensation incentives. 
Hence, product distribution continues to remain a 
challenge. 
• Lastly, the biggest challenges currently facing the 
insurance industry are in the health coverage sector, 
where increasing costs and a rapidly aging US population 
market it extremely difficult for insurers to forecast 
future costs and appropriately price their products. 
1.3 Europe 
This region encompasses relatively mature insurance markets, including 
Germany and the UK, as well as the emerging markets of the Central 
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Eastern European (CEE) region. Many of the top insurers have seen a strong 
performance in the UK market in the life and pension sectors, which are 
expected to continue as high-growth markets. The rise in the equity markets 
has also increased the sale of bonds and investments. Fiscal and regulatory 
changes in some Central European countries have created difficult 
conditions for insurers. In Germany, investment bond volumes have been 
affected by the flattening yield curve. In Belgium, sales were generally 
lower after the introduction of a 1.1% insurance tax levy on life insurance 
premiums at the beginning of 2006.  
In Spain, there has been an overall decline in the sale of savings products, 
which were adversely affected by the tax changes announced for 2007. The 
Netherlands has also been affected by competitive pricing and regulatory 
and fiscal changes. For example, new legislation adversely affected the 
sickness benefits market. Interest rate changes, however, had a positive 
impact on guarantee provisions and related hedges, which helped to increase 
the operating earnings of several insurers in this area. 
The Eastern European region has proved to be more promising. There has 
been significant growth in pensions in Eastern Europe, partly due to 
continuing regulatory reforms in several countries, including Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Hungary. A change to the tax regime in Hungary in 
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2006 led to a fall in the sales of the top insurers in the region. Several of the 
top insurers have continued to build the size of their businesses within the 
CEE region during 2006, reflecting growth expectations.  
Big insurance players in the UK are strongly capitalized and are under 
pressure from investors to deliver further growth. As the existing markets 
are generally mature, companies have become more willing to explore 
acquisitions, particularly in the emerging high-growth European and Asian 
markets. Overall, further consolidation seems likely, especially on a cross-
border basis, as the industry still has the scope for global consolidation. 
Super specialization is the hallmark of the US and UK markets. There are 
insurers and re-insurers who specialize in a particular product and are 
regarded as the best in their respective segments. 
 
A recent initiative has been to offer incentives to customers for 
demonstrating a healthy lifestyle. The first of its kind in the UK, Prudential’s 
private medical insurer, PruHealth, has tied up with Sainsbury’s to offer 
rewards to people for buying healthy food products. Under this scheme, a 
policyholder can collect what are known as ”vitality” points for buying fresh 
fruit and vegetables, which will be used at the end of the year to offset 
his/her future premiums. 
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An interesting innovation in the field of motor insurance has been in the 
form of telematics motor policies. For instance, Norwich Union launched a 
Pay As You Drive (PAYD) scheme in November 2006, under which 
premiums are calculated, based on how, when and where the car is used. 
This is done through GPS technology and a telematics box fitted into the 
policyholder’s car. 
 
1.4 The Asia-Pacific region 
Rapid economic expansion and the rising affluence of the middle classes in 
most countries in the Asia-Pacific region have driven the development of 
this region’s insurance industry. The relaxation of regulatory controls in 
Asia has led insurers worldwide to increase their reach into Asian countries 
that were once considered impenetrable to outsiders. Continuing 
liberalization has made the Asia-Pacific region more attractive as an 
investment destination. Many Asian countries have removed, or are in the 
process of removing, the limits on foreign equity participation in the 
insurance sector.  
The domestic insurers in the region are facing increasing competition from 
global players such as AIG, Allianz and ING, among others. This is 
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particularly so in India, where LIC’s market share reduced by 13% in three 
years from 95.3% in FY04 to 81.9% in FY07. 
Japan has the largest insurance market in the Asia-Pacific region. However, 
it is slowly losing its competitiveness to Asia’s two fastest growing markets 
— China and India. With the speed at which China is liberalizing, it remains 
the most preferred investment destination in this region. 
The insurance markets in Southeast Asia, as those in Singapore and 
Thailand, have great potential to be among Asia’s insurance powerhouses. 
According to Swiss Re, the agricultural insurance sector in Asia is at a very 
nascent stage with a very low penetration rate. However, growing 
government participation and the level of commitment shown by private 
insurers is spurring the development of this sector. Due to a rise in shipping 
activities, marine insurance in Asia is gaining momentum. Singapore, Hong 
Kong and Taiwan are currently the main marine insurance markets in Asia, 
with China in the race as well. 
For the purpose of distribution, the use of insurance brokers is becoming 
more prevalent in Asia due to the lower costs involved. With the increase in 
the number of insurance companies and the rising demand for insurance 
products, more insurance brokers are expected to enter this market. 
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Indian general and life insurance premiums have been very low as compared 
to other developing countries, including China and Taiwan. In addition, the 
insurance penetration rate is low in India, primarily due to low premiums 
and higher GDP. Per capita insurance premiums are also low, mainly due to 
a large population. The following table shows insurance premiums in 
various countries in 2007. 
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Table 1.1 
Insurance premiums in various countries 
 
1.5 India 
India’s insurance industry recently underwent major structural changes. Both 
the life and general insurance sectors, which were nationalized in the 1950s 
and 1960s, respectively, saw an across-the-board liberalization process in 
2000. Since then, the Indian insurance sector has enjoyed rapid growth. In 
terms of total premiums, the Indian insurance sector is the fifth-largest 
insurance market in Asia as of FY07. The life insurance sector is slated to 
grow at 30% in FY08, as compared to 95% in the last fiscal. The total 
  
Page  17  
  
income from life premiums is expected to  exceed INR 2,000 billion (USD 
50 billion) by the end of FY08, as against INR 1,500 billion (USD 40 
billion) in the previous fiscal. The general insurance segment, on the other 
hand, is expected to grow at 15% to INR 290 billion by the end of FY08 
from INR 256 billion during the corresponding period last year.  
The current foreign shareholding limit in India is fixed at 26% in the life and 
general insurance sectors. There have been negotiations to increase this limit 
to 49%, as foreign partners want to be more proactive in running their 
businesses using differentiated strategies. Indian regulators will however 
take some time to take a decision on increasing the FDI limit as this will 
reduce the stake of local promoters.   
The Government introduced reforms in the insurance sector in 1990s, 
primarily to encourage more domestic investments to increase insurance 
coverage and create an efficient and competitive insurance industry. The 
Government’s monopoly came to an end in 1991 when restrictions on the 
entry of private and foreign companies were lifted. The following table 
summarizes some of the significant milestones in the introduction of 
insurance reforms in India. 
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Table 1.2 
Milestones in Insurance reforms in India 
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1.6 INSURANCE SECTOR REFORMS: 
In 1993, Malhotra committee headed by former finance secretary and RBI 
governor R.N.Malhotra was formed to evaluate the Indian insurance 
industry and recommend its future direction. 
The Malhotra committee was set up with the objective of complementing 
the reforms initiated in the financial sector. 
In 1994, the committee submitted the report and some of the key 
recommendations included the following: 
1.6.1 Structure: 
  Government stake in the insurance companies to be brought down 
to 50%. 
  Government should take over the holdings of GIC and its 
subsidiaries so that these subsidiaries can act as independent 
corporations. 
  All the insurance companies should be given greater freedom to 
operate. 
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1.6.2 Competition: 
  Private companies with a minimum paid up capital of Rs.1 bn. 
should be allowed to enter the industry. 
  No company should deal in both life and general insurance 
through a single entity. 
  Foreign companies may be allowed to enter the industry in 
collaboration with the domestic companies. 
  Postal life insurance should be allowed to enter the rural market. 
  Only one state level Life insurance co. should be allowed to 
operate in each state. 
 
1.6.3 Regulatory body: 
  The Insurance Act should be changed 
  An Insurance regulatory body should be set up 
  Controller of Insurance should be made independent. 
 
1.6.4 Investments: 
  Mandatory Investment of LIC life fund in government securities 
should be reduced from 75% to 50%. 
  GIC and its subsidiaries are not to hold more than 50% in any 
company. 
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1.6.5 Customer services: 
  LIC should pay interest on delays in payments beyond 30 days. 
  The committee emphasized that in order to improve the customer 
services and increase the coverage of insurance policies industry 
should be opened to competition. But at the same time committee 
felt the need of exercise caution as any failure on the part of new 
players could ruin the public confidence in industry. 
 
The committee felt the need to provide greater autonomy to 
insurance companies with economic motives. For this purpose, it 
had proposed setting up an independent regulatory body---The 
Insurance Regulatory & Development Authority. 
 
Reforms in the insurance sector were initiated with the passing of 
the IRDA bill in parliament. 
 
1.7 Life Insurance Corporation Of India: 
The Life Insurance Corporation of India was established by the Insurance 
Act 1956, with a view to provide insurance cover against various risks in 
life. According to the provision of the Act, the corporation began to 
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function as an autonomous body and has necessarily run on sound 
business principles. The government of India nationalized life insurance 
business in 1956. The initial paid up capital of Rs. 5crore is wholly 
contributed by government to the Life Insurance Corporation of India. 
 
          1.7.1 Aims of LIC: 
Life Insurance Corporation of India has come into force with 
following aims: 
a) To assure full protection to the policy holder. 
b) To encourage & mobilize public savings. 
c) Effective utilization of those savings in different forms of 
investments for national & economic development. 
d) To create liquidity position in public. 
e) To motivate saving habits in public. 
f) Provisions for old age and tax concession.   
 1.7.2 Important functions of LIC: 
Life Insurance Corporation of India has come into force with 
following aims:   
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a) To ensure absolute security is the first and foremost 
function to the prospective policy holder of life 
insurance. 
b) Underwriting is the important activity of Life Insurance 
Corporation i.e. scrutinizing and making decisions on the 
proposals for the insurance. 
c) Issuing policy documents to the policy holders for the 
evidence of the Insurance contract. 
d) Life insurance vitally protects the common man by 
providing cover through individual policies, group 
schemes and social security schemes. 
e) Development & prosperity of insurance companies will 
create employment opportunities in rural & urban areas. 
f) To make intensive and extensive publicity drives in 
public for mobilizing insurance business. 
g) To encourage mobilization for development through 
mopping up of savings and also to have better utilization 
of those savings. 
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h) To contribute social oriented investment to improve the 
quality of the society, especially with respect to 
electricity, water supply, housing and agro based 
industries. 
i) Life Insurance Corporation has been giving high priority 
for rendering various services to policy holders. The 
focus of LIC is on service related to registration of 
nomination, assignment, change in address and revival of 
lapsed policy, payment of loan and surrender on 
settlement of claims. 
j) Other important functions are maintaining accounts, 
management of personnel, processing of data, 
formulating policies, procedures, setting up of objectives 
and goals, compliance with regulations and law of the 
country. 
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1.7.3 Organization structure of LIC: 
To perform the functions of the Life Insurance Corporation of 
India, a Board of Directors consisting of 15 members is 
appointed by the central government. The organization structure 
of Life Insurance Corporation of India has a four tier structure. 
They are 1) Central Office 2) Zonal Offices 3) Divisional 
Offices 4) Branch Offices. 
The central office is to perform the activities relating to 
investments, framing  and administering the rules and 
regulations of corporation. There are seven Zonal offices and 
hundred Divisional offices which are established on the basis of 
geographical areas. They discharge their coordinating functions 
relating to central offices and zonal offices. In branch offices 
almost 90% of the functions relate to the policy holders. 
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 1.7.4   Plans of LIC: 
The plans are covered with risk of life called life insurance. Life 
Insurance policies provide two fold advantages, the first in the 
form of small savings and second in the form of risk coverage. 
It is a type of small savings because after maturing of the 
policy, the policy holders get a large amount which will be a 
significant base for old age expenses. The second advantage of 
risk coverage helps the policy holder in becoming tension free 
because if there is any misfortune or accident due to which 
premature death occurs then remaining family members will get 
sufficient funds from the life insurance. 
The Insurance sector deals with offering insurance policies for 
public benefit. The various offered policies by LIC are 
represented in the following chart 
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1.7.5 Role of LIC in national economy:  
The role of LIC involves all the activities related to national economy, 
individual and society. 
Insurance 
Policy
Life
Risk 
Coverage
Whole Life Endowment
Limited 
time Term Based
Pension 
Plan
Unite Based Fixed Term Immediate Pension
Money 
Back Education Marriage
Natural Accidental
General
  
Page  28  
  
Following are the important areas identified. 
1.7.5.1   INVESTMENT Life Insurance Corporation is acting as 
capital market intermediaries. It provides long term 
investment in government securities, public sector, 
cooperative sector, private sector, joint sector. The long 
term funds which are provided by Insurance Corporation 
can be utilized to meet the requirements of the 
infrastructure sector in the country. 
 
1.7.5.2 UNDREWRITING LIC has been the largest underwriter of 
capital issues in the Indian capital market till the year 1978 
after which it has reduced its activities in favour of socially 
oriented projects. During the year 1983, onwards LIC 
underwrites firms and prefers large established companies. 
As an underwriter it influences the capital market 
considerably and is also able to stabilize the market during 
the downswings or depression periods. 
 
1.7.5.3 DISBURSING LOANS Since 1970 LIC has disbursing 
loans for industrial development. One of the major avenues 
of investment in every year is constituted by financing loans. 
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It has given loans for generation and transmission of 
electricity for agriculture and industrial use, housing 
schemes, piped water supply schemes and development of 
road and transport. Out of the total disbursement of all 
financial institutions to the industry, LIC’s contribution 
comes to around 8%. 
 
1.7.5.4 SHARE HOLDING By virtue of its share holding LIC has 
been recognized amongst the top ten shareholders in one of 
every three companies listed in the stock exchange on which 
it has a share in companies. LIC has invested a large blocks 
of equities in later years. In 2006 had invested around Rs.10, 
000crore in equities. The market value of equity portfolio is 
about Rs.84, 000crore. 
 
1.7.5.5 CLAIMS & SETTLEMENT The settlement of claims 
constitute one of the important functions of the LIC. There 
are four types of claims paid by the Life Insurance in general 
i.e. death claims, maturity claims surrender and payment of 
annuities. Proper settlement of claim is provided on the basis 
on the sound knowledge of law, principles & practices 
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governing insurance contracts terms and conditions of 
standard policies etc. LIC settles largest number of claims 
every year. It settles a remarkable 45, 000 claims per 
working day to the tune of Rs. 65crore. 
 
1.7.5.6 SUBSCRIBING TO DEBENTURES & BONDS Financial 
institutions and corporate enterprise requiring burgeoning 
funds to meet their expanding needs find it easier and 
cheaper to raise funds from the market by issuing 
commercial papers. LIC also subscribes to debentures and 
bonds of various financial institutions and development 
banks like IDBI & IFCI. 
 
1.7.5.7 MUTUAL FUND LIC has set up, a Mutual fund for 
operating various schemes for mobilization of savings from 
public particularly the rural and urban areas and channelizes 
these funds to the capital market. LIC has considerable 
expertise in investment management by virtue of its earlier 
operations of funds. 
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1.7.5.8 BOOSTING INDUSTRIAL GROWTH The Corporation 
helps in boosting the industrial growth in the country. It 
helps small scale and medium scale industries by granting 
loans for setting up co-operative industrial estates. The 
Corporation also makes investment in the corporate sector in 
the form of long, medium and short term loans. The total 
investment made by way of loans up to year 2001 was Rs. 
2812crores and by way of subscriptions to shares and 
debentures was Rs. 35048crores. All this makes a distinct 
contribution towards growth in industrialization and 
generation of skilled and unskilled employment 
opportunities in the country. 
 
1.7.5.9 SOCIALLY ORIENTED A basic feature of financial 
liberalization and many innovations are the trend towards 
social orientation. LIC has resorted to socially oriented 
schemes in a big way since 1978.The rationale behind this 
has been to go in for developmental work of the society. 
Own your house schemes (OYH) have been given priority. 
Apart from these loans for sewerage, road and transport and 
electricity generation have also been given priority in recent 
years. 
  
Page  32  
  
The effect of insurance reforms has been positive on the insurance 
industry. There has been positive growth in all the segments, with 
investments flowing in the right direction. Reforms have helped to 
achieve rapid growth in critical areas and sustain them over a period 
of time through channelized strategies.  
Post reforms, the number of players have increased from four in life 
insurance and eight in general insurance in 2000 to 21 life players and 
20 general insurance players, including one reinsurer, in 2008. The 
bifurcation of players across industry segments over the years is 
provided below: 
Table 1.3 
Growth in the number of Insurers during 2000-2008 
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The strong growth in recent years has increased penetration levels 
substantially, but India is still scarcely penetrated as compared to 
other economies and global standards. The premium income in the 
country as a percentage of its GDP increased from 3.3% in FY03 to 
4.7% in FY07.  
This remarkable increase has been a result of the growing contribution 
of the life insurance sector as compared to the general insurance 
sector. The contribution of life insurance premiums to the GDP has 
increased from 2.7% to 4.1% during the same period. However, the 
contribution of the general insurance sector has remained almost 
constant. 
The growth of the insurance sector in the last five years has made it 
one of the promising sectors in the economy. The following graph 
depicts premium income as a percentage of GDP (life and 
general): 
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CHART -I 
Premium income as a percentage of GDP  
(life and general) 
 
 
On observing the premium per capita of life and general insurance, 
and the total premiums, it is clear that with the  growth of the 
population at a CAGR of 1.4% during FY03–07, premiums per capita 
have also increased substantially. The following table shows first 
premium collected by various insurance players. 
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Table 1.4 
First year premiums collected by life insurance players  
(INR million) 
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Table 1.5 
Premium collected by various players (INR million) 
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CHART - II 
Number of policies sold in the life insurance sector  
(First year premiums) 
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CHART – III 
 
Market Share of Top Players in Insurance  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When we look at the first year premium contribution by the private 
and public sectors, LIC still holds a monopoly. However, the share of 
premiums from private companies has increased from a mere 6% in 
FY03 to approximately 36% in FY08. LIC is losing market share to 
the private sector as private players are offering a larger variety of 
products. Additionally, these companies are pursuing aggressive 
marketing and distribution growth strategies, thereby increasing their 
consumer reach. On comparing the total premiums of the private and 
public sectors, the contribution of the private sector has increased 
from 2% in FY03 to approximately 18% in FY07. The share of the 
public sector, which was 82% in FY07, is on a gradual decline.  
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Table 1.6 
Regulatory framework and need for a conducive 
environment 
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In the near future, the insurance industry is expected to grow both in 
stature and strength. Insurers shall be less financially vulnerable to the 
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vagaries of the market because of the adoption of a prudential 
regulatory regime, which has set very high solvency requirements and 
capital adequacy norms. Domestic institutions — both insurers and 
intermediaries — are expected to catch up with their international 
counterparts with respect to efficiency, innovation and customer 
services. Productivity levels are expected to be as per international 
best practices. The level of market penetration is also expected to 
improve substantially. Most regulations become obsolete almost as 
soon as they are formulated. 
With evolving industry dynamics, it is essential to step up regulations 
to keep pace with the exponential growth in the industry. Regulators 
in emerging markets should be in tandem with product innovations, 
alternative distribution channels, electronically-linked payment 
systems, e-commerce, investment avenues and alternative risk 
transfers etc. It has become imperative not only to formulate or update 
regulations, but also for the industry to adhere to these regulatory 
compliance policies and procedures. A more sophisticated approach to 
risk management, financial reporting and corporate governance will 
be necessary for insurance companies to meet these requirements. 
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This would ensure sustenance in growth, which augurs well for the 
insurance industry in India over the long term. 
 
The government regulation can either promote or hinder insurance 
provisions. A conducive regulatory framework is essential for 
achieving sustainability and at the same time needed for the 
expanding insurance services (for instance, large-scale, cost-covering 
and long-term provision) to all income segments of the society. 
Regulations have proven vital from the stage of having a new player 
in the industry. It is necessary to gauge the financial strength, track 
record  and  reputation of promoters, particularly with regard to 
compliance with regulations and the strength of internal control 
systems. IRDA has also been keen to see the industry develop in 
terms of product innovation and the use of alternative distribution 
channels.  
Applicants with a strong record in these areas, or in specialist and 
niche fields, and those with experience in the health insurance 
business have received favorable consideration. In addition to strict 
scrutiny at the point of entry, regulators also provide for constant 
monitoring of the performance of the companies as a check against 
lax management practices, which may result in loss to policyholders. 
  
Page  44  
  
Regulators protect policyholders against excessive insolvency risk by 
requiring insurers to meet certain financial standards and act prudently 
in managing their affairs. 
The statutes require insurers to meet minimum capital and surplus 
standards and financial reporting requirements and authorize 
regulators to take other actions to protect policyholders’ interest. 
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CHAPTER – II 
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF 
INDIA: PRE AND POST LIBERALIZATION 
 
2.1 Introduction 
India had the nineteenth largest insurance market in the world in 2003. 
Strong economic growth in the last decade combined with a population of 
over a billion makes it one of the potentially largest markets in the future. 
Insurance in India has gone through two radical transformations. Before 
1956, insurance was private with minimal government intervention. In 1956, 
life insurance was nationalized and a monopoly was created. In 1972, 
general insurance was nationalized as well But, unlike life insurance, a 
different structure was created for the industry. One holding company was 
formed with four subsidiaries. As a part of the general opening up of the 
economy after 1992, a Government appointed committee recommended that 
private companies should be allowed to operate. It took six years to 
implement the recommendation. Private sector was allowed into insurance 
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business in 2000. However, foreign ownership was restricted. No more than 
26% of any company can be foreign-owned.  
In what follows, we examine the insurance industry in India through 
different regulatory regimes. A totally regulation free regime ended in 1912 
with the introduction of regulation of life insurance. A comprehensive 
regulatory scheme came into place in 1938. This was disabled through 
nationalization. But, the Insurance Act of 1938 became relevant again in 
2000 with deregulation. With a strong hint of sustained growth of the 
economy in the recent past, the Indian market is likely to grow substantially 
over the next few decades.  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First, we study the evolution 
of insurance business before nationalization. This is important because the 
denationalized structure brought back to play important legal rules from 
1938. Next we analyze the nationalized era separately for life and property 
casualty business as they were not nationalized simultaneously. Much of 
post-independence history of insurance in India was the history of 
nationalized insurance. In the following section, we examine the new legal 
structure introduced after the industry was denationalized in 2000. In the 
penultimate section, we examine the current state of play and projected 
future of the industry. The final section sets out conclusions.  
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2.2 Evolution of Insurance: Insurance in the Colonial 
Era.  
Life insurance in the modern form was first set up in India through a British 
company called the Oriental Life Insurance Company in 1818 followed by 
the Bombay Assurance Company in 1823 and the Madras Equitable Life 
Insurance Society in 1829. All of these companies operated in India but did 
not insure the lives of Indians. They were insuring the lives of Europeans 
living in India. 
Some of the companies that started later did provide insurance for Indians. 
But, they were treated as “substandard”. Substandard in insurance parlance 
refers to lives with physical disability. In this case, the common adjustment 
made was a “rating-up” of five to seven years to normal British life in India. 
This meant, treating q(x), the (conditional) probability of dying between x 
and x+1, for an x year old Indian male as if it was q(x+5) or q(x+7) of a 
British male. Therefore, Indian lives had to pay an ad hoc extra premium of 
20% or more. This was a common practice of the European companies at the 
time whether they were operating in Asia or Latin America. The first 
company to sell policies to Indians with “fair value” was the Bombay 
Mutual Life Assurance Society starting in 1871.  
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The first general insurance company, Triton Insurance Company Ltd., 
was established in 1850. It was owned and operated by the British. The first 
indigenous general insurance company was the Indian Mercantile Insurance 
Company Limited set up in Bombay in 1907.  
Insurance business was conducted in India without any specific regulation 
for the insurance business. They were subject to Indian Companies Act 
(1866). After the start of the “Be Indian Buy Indian Movement” (called 
Swadeshi Movement) in 1905, indigenous enterprises sprang up in many 
industries. Not surprisingly, the Movement also touched the insurance 
industry leading to the formation of dozens of life insurance companies 
along with provident fund companies (provident fund companies are pension 
funds). In 1912, two sets of legislation were passed: the Indian Life 
Assurance Companies Act and the Provident Insurance Societies Act. There 
are several striking features of these legislations. First, they were the first 
legislations in India that particularly targeted the insurance sector. Second, 
they left general insurance business out of it. The government did not feel 
the necessity to regulate general insurance. Third, they restricted activities of 
the Indian insurers but not the foreign insurers even though the model used 
was the British Act of 1909.  
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Comprehensive insurance legislation covering both life and non-life 
business did not materialize for the next twenty-six years. During the first 
phase of these years, Great Britain entered World War I. This event 
disrupted all legislative initiatives. Later, Indians demanded freedom from 
the British. As a concession, India was granted “home rule” through the 
Government of India Act of 1935. It provided for Legislative Assemblies for 
provincial governments as well as for the central government. But supreme 
authority of promulgated laws still stayed with the British Crown.  
The only significant legislative change before the Insurance Act of 1938, 
was Act XX of 1928. It enabled the Government of India to collect 
information of (1) Indian insurance companies operating in India, (2) 
Foreign insurance companies operating in India and (3) Indian insurance 
companies operating in foreign countries. The last two elements were 
missing from the 1912 Insurance Act. Information thus collected allows us 
to compare the average size face value of Indian insurance companies 
against their foreign counterparts. In 1928, the average policy value of an 
Indian company was 619 US dollars against 1,150 US dollars for foreign 
companies (Source: Indian Insurance Commissioner’s Report, 1929, p. 
23).  
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Foreign insurance companies were doing well during that period. In 1938, 
the average size of the policy sold by Indian companies has fallen to 532 US 
dollars (in comparison with 619 US dollars in 1928) and that of foreign 
companies had risen somewhat to 1, 188 US dollars (in 1928, the average 
size was 1,150 US dollars).  
2.3 Insurance Act, 1938  
In 1937, the Government of India set up a consultative committee. Mr. 
Sushil C. Sen, a well known solicitor of Calcutta, was appointed the chair of 
the committee. He consulted a wide range of interested parties including the 
industry. It was debated in the Legislative Assembly. Finally, in 1938, the 
Insurance Act was passed. This piece of legislation was the first 
comprehensive one in India. It covered both life and general insurance 
companies. It clearly defined what would come under the life insurance 
business, the fire insurance business and so on (see Appendix- 1). It covered 
deposits, supervision of insurance companies, investments, commissions of 
agents, directors appointed by the policyholders among others. This piece of 
legislation lost significance after nationalization. Life insurance was 
nationalized in 1956 and general insurance in 1972 respectively. With the 
privatization in the late Twentieth Century, it has returned as the backbone 
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of the current legislation of insurance companies. All legislative changes are 
enumerated in Table 2.1 
Table 2.1 
 
Insurance In India : Legislative Changes 
1912 The Indian Life Insurance Company Act  
1928 Indian Insurance Companies Act  
1938 The Insurance Act: Comprehensive Act to regulate insurance 
business in India  
1956 Nationalization of life insurance business in India with a 
monopoly awarded to the Life Insurance Corporation of India  
1972 Nationalization of general insurance business in India with the 
formation of a holding company General Insurance 
Corporation  
1993 Setting up of Malhotra Committee  
1994 Recommendations of Malhotra Committee published  
1995 Setting up of Mukherjee Committee  
1996 Setting up of (interim) Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) 
Recommendations of the IRA  
1997 Mukherjee Committee Report submitted but not made public  
1997 The Government gives greater autonomy to Life Insurance 
Corporation, General Insurance Corporation and its 
subsidiaries with regard to the restructuring of boards and 
flexibility in investment norms aimed at channeling funds to 
the infrastructure sector  
1998 The cabinet decides to allow 40% foreign equity in private 
insurance companies-26% to foreign companies and 14% to 
Non-resident Indians and Foreign Institutional Investors  
1999 The Standing Committee headed by Murali Deora decides that 
foreign equity in private insurance should be limited to 26%. 
The IRA bill is renamed the Insurance Regulatory and 
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Development Authority Bill  
1999 Cabinet clears Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority Bill  
2000 President gives Assent to the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority Bill  
 
 
To implement the 1938 Act, an insurance department (that became known as 
the insurance wing) was first set up in the Ministry of Commerce by the 
Government of India. Later, it was transferred to the Ministry of Finance. 
One curious element of classification used (Appendix 1) was to include 
automobile insurance in the “miscellaneous” category. Later in the century, 
automobiles became the largest single item of general insurance. However, it 
continued to be included in that category making it difficult to delineate the 
effects of losses due to pricing that drove this sector. For example, the Tariff 
Advisory Committee effectively fixed prices for a number of general 
insurance lines of business. Most premiums were below what would have 
been actuarially fair (especially for auto). But reporting auto insurance under 
the miscellaneous category masked this under pricing.  
 
When the market was opened again to private participation in 1999, the 
earlier Insurance Act of 1938 was reinstated as the backbone of the current 
legislation of insurance companies, as the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority Act of 1999 was superimposed on the 1938 
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Insurance Act. This revival of the Act has created a messy problem. The 
Insurance Act of 1938 explicitly forbade financial services from the 
activities permitted by insurance companies.  
By 1956, there were 154 Indian life insurance companies. There were 16 
non-Indian insurance companies and 75 provident societies were issuing life 
insurance policies. Most of these policies were centered in the cities 
(especially around big cities like Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras).  
 
2.3.1 Mortality Tables 
Before the mortality of Indian lives were used for constructing 
mortality tables for India, it was common practice to use the 
British Office Table O(M) based on the British experience 
during 1863-1893. As was noted earlier, the table was used 
with a rating up of five to seven years to approximate Indian 
lives. The first ever Indian table based on assured Indian lives 
was created based on the experience of Oriental Government 
Security Life Assurance Co. Ltd. for the period 1905-25 
(Vaidyanathan, 1934). It was noted that the lowest mortality 
was experienced by the Endowment policies and the highest 
mortality was experienced by the Whole Life policies. 
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Subsequent updates were produced by the Life Insurance 
Corporation in the 1970s (called LIC 75-79) and in the 1990s 
(called LIC 94-96).  
Given that the Life Insurance Corporation was a monopoly, it 
had no incentives to update mortality tables frequently. Indeed, 
the Malhotra Committee noted this fact as follows. “Quite a few 
persons including, notably, representatives of consumer groups 
have told the Committee that Life Insurance Corporation 
premium rates had remained unrevised for a long period and 
were unjustifiably high in spite of the fact that trends in 
mortality rates all over the country are continuously showing 
improvement” (Malhotra, 1994, Chapter V, Section 5.4, p. 33). 
The Report recommended that such tables be published every 
ten years (Malhotra, 1994, Chapter V, Section 5.12, p. 37).  
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2.4 Evolution of Insurance During Nationalized Era: 1956-
2000: Rationale for Nationalization.  
After India became independent in 1947, National Planning modeled after 
the Soviet Union was implemented. Nowhere it was more evident in the 
Second Five Year Plan implemented by the Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru. His vision was to have key industries under direct government 
control to facilitate the implementation of National Planning. Insurance 
business (or for that matter, any financial service) was not seen to be of 
strategic importance.  
Therefore, there are two questions we need to address. First, why did the 
Government of India nationalize life insurance in 1956? Second, why did it 
not nationalize general insurance at the same time?  
We deal with the first question first. The genesis of nationalization of life 
insurance came from a document produced by Mr. H. D. Malaviya called 
“Insurance Business in India” on behalf of the Indian National Congress. 
Mr. Malaviya had written a dozen books. This was one of the more obscure 
ones In that document, he made four important claims to justify 
nationalization. First, he argued that insurance is a “cooperative enterprise,” 
under a socialist form of government, therefore, it is more suited for 
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government to be in insurance business on behalf of the “people”. Second, 
he claimed that Indian companies are excessively expensive. Third, he 
argued that private competition has not improved services to the “public” or 
to the policyholders. Preventative activities such as better public health, 
medical check-up, hazard prevention activities did not improve. Fourth, 
lapse ratios of life policies were very high leading to “national waste.”  
His argument for high cost of Indian insurers is the only one that he beefed 
up with data. Others were made in vague terms. Therefore, we take a closer 
look at his evidence. Based on some data, he presents what he called 
“overall expenses” of insurance business operation in India, USA and UK. 
His calculations are shown in Table 2.2. He showed that it costs Indian 
insurers 27%-28% of premium income for insuring lives whereas in the 
USA, the corresponding figure is 16%-17%. In the UK, it is even lower at 
13%-14%. On the face of it, this argument seems watertight. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case. On closer inspection on how the numbers were arrived 
at, we find that for the calculation, the denominator used for India is not the 
same used for the USA or the UK. Specifically, for the Indian numbers, the 
denominator uses premium income only, whereas, for the other two 
countries, the denominator uses total income that includes premium income 
and investment income (as is customary world over).  
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Table 2.2 
 
Overall Expenses of Life Insurance Business  
in India, USA and UK  
 
(all figures are in percentages) Year 
 India USA UK 
1950 28.9 16.8 13.0 
1951 27.2 16.5 14.1 
1952 27.1 16.7 14.2 
1953 27.3 17.0 14.5 
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The Finance Minister C. D. Deshmukh announced nationalization of the 
life insurance business. In his speech, he justified the action as follows.  
 
INCOME Total premium 
income 
Income from 
investment 
Total income 
139.02
30.28
169.3
253.42
59.04
312.45
516.16
180.93
697.09
Overall Expenses of Life Insurance 
Business  in India, USA and UK 
1957 1963 1972
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“With the Second Plan, involving an accelerated 
rate of investment and development, the widening 
and deepening of all possible channels of public 
savings has become more than ever necessary. Of 
this process, the nationalization of insurance is a 
vital part.” He then went on to declare, “The total 
[life] insurance in force exceeds Rs. 10,000 
millions, that is a little over Rs. 25 per had. Quite 
recently it was claimed on behalf of a private 
enterprise that business in force could be 
increased to Rs. 80,000 millions and per capita 
insurance to Rs. 200. I am in complete agreement. 
There can be no doubt as to the possibilities of life 
insurance in India and I mention these figures only 
to show how greatly we could increase our savings 
through insurance.” He added, “Thus even in 
insurance which is a type of business which ought 
never to fail if it is properly run, we find that 
during the last decade as many as twenty five life 
insurance companies went into liquidation and 
another twenty five had so frittered away their 
resources that their business had to be transferred 
to other companies at a loss to the policyholders.” 
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Thus, the nationalization was justified based on three distinct arguments. 
First, the government wanted to use the resources for its own purpose. 
Clearly that meant that the government was not willing to pay market rate of 
return for the assets (otherwise, they could have raised the capital whether 
insurance companies were private or public). 
Second, it sought to increase market penetration by nationalization. How 
could nationalization possibly deepen the market that private insurance 
companies cannot? There are two possibilities. (1) Nationalization would 
create a monopoly. If there are economies of scale in the market, it would 
thus become possible for government to cut the cost of operation per policy 
sold below what private companies could. (2) Through nationalization 
government could take life insurance in rural areas where it was not 
profitable for private businesses to sell insurance. Third, the government 
found the number of failures of insurance companies to be unacceptable. 
The government claimed that the failures were the result of mismanagement.  
 
Given that by the end of the century the government would de-nationalize 
life insurance, we would examine in some detail whether nationalization did 
succeed in these three areas. The government did succeed in channeling the 
resources of life insurance business into infrastructure.  
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The Life Insurance Corporation of India, as of March 2001, had a total sum 
assured of 155 billion US dollars. The value of Life Fund was 40 billion US 
dollars. The book value of Life Insurance Corporation’s “socially oriented 
investments”– mainly comprising of government securities holdings – at 
end-March 2001 amounted to 27 billion US dollars (73% of a total portfolio 
value of 37 billion US dollars). In total, 84% of Life Insurance Corporation’s 
portfolio comprises of exposure to the public sector (see Bhattacharya and 
Patel, 2003, Appendix 2).  
The Reserve Bank of India Weekly Statistical Supplement, October 11, 2003 
shows that 52% of the outstanding stock of government securities is held by 
just two public sector institutions: the State Bank of India and the Life 
Insurance Corporation of India approximately in equal proportions. 
Did the nationalization and consequent creation of monopoly actually reduce 
the cost of issuing life insurance policies? If we take a simple view of the 
world and calculate overall costs, we arrive at the results shown in Table 3. 
If we calculate overall expenses as a percentage of premium income, we 
arrive at the following. In 1957, the expenses were 27.7%. By 1963, the 
expenses rose to 29.3%. It fell back to 27.9% by 1982. By 1992, it had fallen 
to 21.5%. In 2002, it rose to 22.9%. Could we conclude that in the decade of 
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late 1980s, the economies of scale kicked in? The answer is negative. The 
reason is explained in the Malhotra Committee Report (Malhotra, 1994, 
Chapter V, Section 5.5, p. 34). The expense ratio reported there was 29% in 
1958 and 25% in 1992. The Report excludes group polices from its 
calculation. Group polices are much cheaper to sell (per policy). These 
policies did not exist in 1958. But, starting in the 1980s, they became 
commonplace. Thus, the naïve calculation along this line will lead us to 
believe that the expense ratio has come down substantially whereas in 
reality, that is an incorrect conclusion. A number of government reports have 
come to the same wrong conclusion (for example, the Annual Report of the 
Ministry of Finance 1995-96, p. 3). 
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Table 2.3 
Financial Performance of Life Insurance 
Corporation of India 1957-1992 
 (all figures are in millions of US dollars) 
INCOME 1957 1963 1972 1982 1992 
Total premium income  139.02 253.42 516.16  1284.81  2836.36 
Income from investment  30.28 59.04 180.93  727.22  1511.72 
Total income  169.30 312.45 697.09  2012.03  4348.08 
OUTGO  
Commission etc. to agents  12.08 23.65 48.74  108.33  274.36 
Salaries & other benefits to 
employees  19.14 37.40 76.95  126.27  284.02 
Other expenses of management  7.22 13.25 18.15  41.14  90.91 
Taxes Etc.  0.26  56.75  150.11 
5 % valuation surplus paid to Govt.  2.85  37.43 
PAYMENTS TO POLICY HOLDERS  
Claims by maturity  32.64 52.49 101.99  369.94  796.73 
Claims by death  12.40 21.13 34.57  91.14  180.47 
Annuities  0.78 0.67 1.99  8.23  37.00 
Surrenders  6.90 8.55 25.43  82.49  257.39 
Total outgo  91.16 160.00 308.08  884.28  2108.42 
Excess of income over outgo  78.14 152.45 
389.01  1127.74  2239.67  
Operating cost/Premium income  
27.70
% 29.30% 27.90%  21.50%  22.90% 
Operating cost/Total income  
22.70
% 23.80% 20.60%  13.70%  14.90% 
 
Source:  Calculation based on Malhotra Committee Report, 1994, Appendix 
XXVI, p. 148. 
 
Note:  All figures are converted into US dollars using the average exchange rate of that year.  
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Financial Performance of Life Insurance Corporation of India 
1957-1992  (all figures are in millions of US dollars) 
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insurance is part and parcel of the private sector of trade and industry 
and functions on a year to year basis. Errors and omission and 
commission in the conduct of its business do not directly affect the 
individual citizen. Life insurance business, by contrast, directly 
concerns the individual citizen whose savings, so vitally needed for 
economic development, may be affected by any acts of folly or 
misfeasance on the part of those in control or be retarded by their lack 
of imaginative policy.” 
Thus, he did not deem general insurance to be “vitally needed for 
economic development.” The only way this view could be justified is 
if we view insurance as a vehicle for long terms investment and if we 
ignore the elimination of uncertainty through insurance as a relatively 
minor benefit. After all, general insurance reduces uncertainty for 
non-life category the same way life insurance reduces uncertainty for 
life.  
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2.5 Rural Insurance 
In his Budget Speech, Mr. Deshmukh had specific hopes for rural insurance. 
He announced, “It will be possible to spread the message of insurance as 
far and as wide as possible, reaching out beyond the most advanced urban 
areas and into hitherto neglected, namely, rural areas.” 
After nationalization, Life Insurance Corporation has specifically taken up 
rural insurance as a target. To promote rural insurance, it followed a 
segmented approach to the market. First, it targeted the rural wealthy with 
regular individual policies. Second, it offered group policies to people who 
could not afford individual policies. For the very poor, it offered government 
subsidized policies. In India, even in 2004, more than half of the population 
live in rural areas and contribute a quarter of the GDP. Thus, the 
policymakers felt that it was essential to bring life insurance business to the 
rural population.  
 
Did the policymakers succeed in bringing insurance in the rural sector? 
Exactly to whom in the rural sector did they manage to bring life insurance? 
We will examine these two questions in what follows.  
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The “success” of the rural expansion can be measured in a number of 
different dimensions. Here we are not talking about success necessarily in 
the sense of commercial success of higher profits. The Finance Minister was 
talking about social objective of bringing insurance cover for the 
“neglected” rural areas. After all, if profits were to be made by the private 
sector in rural insurance, they would not have neglected rural areas. 
Therefore, below we will measure success in terms of penetration of life 
insurance in rural areas.  
 
a. We first examine the penetration of life insurance in terms of headcounts. 
The earliest figure we have is for 1961. Around 36% of all the individual 
life policies sold were in the rural sector. This proportion fell to 29% by 
1970. Then from 1980, the proportion had started to climb. It climbed 
steadily for a decade. Between 1995 and 1999 it climbed even faster with 
fully 57% of all policies sold were in the rural sector. This increase 
between 1980 and 1999 is remarkable for two reasons. First, the 
proportion of people living in rural areas has been falling steadily since 
1950. Second, the fall in the proportion had not only halted since 1980 
but it had been reversed. Thus, there is no question that the Life 
Insurance Corporation, through deliberate policy change managed to 
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penetrate the rural market since 1980 in a way they could not earlier. Of 
course, the headcount gives us only the part of the story. 
 
b. Another way of examining the rural insurance business is in terms of the 
value of the insurance policies sold. In passing we note that during no 
period under study did the value of individual life insurance sold in the 
rural areas as a proportion of the total value of all individual life 
insurance policies sold in India breach 40%. During the late 1990s, even 
though the headcount of rural individual life policies sold kept climbing 
as a proportion of all individual life policies sold, the value of those 
policies did not. This implies that there were more policies sold with a 
smaller average value. This would imply that the profitability of each 
policy sold in the rural area in the late 1990s fell. 
 
c. Finally we examine the value of the average individual life policy sold in 
the rural areas as a percent of the average of all the individual life 
policies sold nationwide. In 1961, this proportion was 84%. It fell almost 
steadily to 74% by 1970. Then it climbed back to 84% in 1990. It has 
hovered around that figure since then. If we examine the per capita 
income in the rural areas and contrast that with the per capita income in 
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the urban areas, we find that for almost all states there is a 50% 
difference. Specifically, if the average rural income is 100, for most 
states, the urban average income is 150. Therefore, the individual life 
insurance policies in the rural areas are not being bought by the average 
rural households but by the relatively wealthy rural households.  
 
Thus, the observations (2) and (3) above raise an uncomfortable question. 
Has the expansion of the Life Insurance Corporation in the rural areas 
served the rural rich at the high cost of reduced profitability of the 
company? Obviously this was not the intention when the Finance 
Minister spoke of serving the neglected rural areas in his speech at the 
eve of nationalizing life insurance in 1956. 
 
2.6 Prelude to nationalization of general insurance: 
Birth of the Tariff Advisory Committee.  
 
The first collective measures to regulate rates and terms and conditions go 
back to 1896 with the formation of Bombay Association of Fire Insurance 
agents. By 1950, there was a set of regulation of rates, accepted by most 
insurers. The Insurance Act of 1938 was amended in 1950 to set up a Tariff 
Committee under the control of the General Insurance Council of the 
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Insurance Association of India. Main lines of general insurance came under 
the Tariff Committee (they included Marine, Fire and Miscellaneous which 
included auto). Over the next eighteen years, Tariff Committee prevailed as 
the “rate maker”. It was obligatory for all insurers.  
 
In 1968, the Insurance Act of 1938 was amended further. A Tariff Advisory 
Committee replaced the Tariff Committee. The Tariff Advisory Committee 
became a statutory body. Section 64UC(2) of the Act stated: “In fixing, 
amending or modifying any rates, advantages, terms or conditions relating to 
any risk, the (Tariff) Advisory Committee shall try to ensure, as far as 
possible, that there is no unfair discrimination between risks of essentially 
the same hazard, and also that consideration is given to past and prospective 
loss experience: provided that the (Tariff) Advisory Committee may, at its 
discretion, make suitable allowances for the degree of credibility to be 
assigned to the past experience including allowances for random fluctuations 
and may also, at its discretion, make suitable allowance for future hazards of 
conflagration or catastrophe or both.”  
 
The introduction of the Tariff Advisory Committee was seen as an 
independent, impartial, scientifically driven body for ratemaking in general 
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insurance. After the nationalization of general insurance in 1972   the Tariff 
Advisory Committee became the handmaiden of the nationalized companies. 
For example, the Chairman of the General Insurance Corporation, the 
holding company of four nationalized subsidiary, also became the Chairman 
of the Tariff Advisory Committee. All members of the Tariff Advisory 
Committee were nominated by the General Insurance Corporation. It came 
under heavy criticism from the Malhotra Committee. The Report stated that 
“the data supplied (by the nationalized companies) was often incomplete and 
outdated and, over the years, the system has almost broken down” 
(Malhotra, Chapter V, Section 5.25, p. 41).  
 
The rates implemented by the Tariff Advisory Committee did not 
necessarily reflect the “market price.” For example, after the amendments of 
the Motor Vehicles Act of 1939 (in 1982 and again in 1988), Third Party 
Liability became unlimited. It became clear that premium rates had to be 
revised upward to reflect this change in law. However, political pressure 
from transporters prevented this rise in premium (Malhotra, 1994, Chapter 
V, Section 5.26, p. 41).  
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Back in 1994, the Malhotra Committee recommended a delinking of the 
Tariff Advisory Committee from the General Insurance Corporation. It also 
recommended a gradual phasing out of the Tariff Advisory Committee with 
the exception of a few areas. However, it did not set a timetable. A recent 
report of a special committee set up by the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority suggests an abolition of the Tariff Advisory 
Committee by April 1, 2006 (see, Report of the Expert Committee, 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority, December 2003).  
 
In India, the Tariff Advisory Committee set a floor price, that is, a minimum 
price is set and all insurance companies have to charge at least that minimum 
price. They could charge more (with the approval of the Tariff Advisory 
Committee). It should be emphasized that tariffication or setting a floor price 
is not unique to India alone. Neither is the practice only followed by 
developing countries. The Malhotra Committee Report noted that two large 
countries like Japan and Germany had similar floor prices in place.  
 
However, the rates were periodically reviewed and adjusted according to the 
market experience (Malhotra, 1994, Chapter V, Section 5.17, p. 39). In 
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Japan, tariffs were abolished coinciding with the liberalization of insurance 
in 1998. In Malaysia, motor and fire insurance are still subject to tariff 
regulations. In Indonesia, tariff regime was introduced in 1983. It continued 
till 1996. In India, detariffication (the removal of tariffs) was introduced in 
1994 in the marine hull business only – the segment of the market dominated 
by foreign companies. Due to political pressure, it refrained from removing 
tariffs in the entire cargo insurance segment (Srinivasan, 2003).  
Any move away from the tariffed regime is not always popular. What 
usually follows is rising premiums in some lines. For example, in India, with 
detariffication, motor insurance prices will rise. This will probably be pinned 
as a folly of privatization. Of course, such premium adjustment has nothing 
to do with privatization per se. Government-owned insurers could take a loss 
in the motor insurance business (as they did during the 1990s) and cover the 
deficit from other lines of business. But, privately run insurance companies 
would seek to generate profit from every line of business. As a result, motor 
insurance premiums will rise to cover losses. Similarly, rating systems based 
on age and experience of the drivers would be slowly introduced. It will be a 
slow and long process as they require individual specific past information 
that can be gathered cost effectively only with computerization    
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2.7 Nationalization of general insurance.  
General insurance was finally nationalized in 1972 (with effect from January 
1, 1973). There were 107 general insurance companies operating at the time. 
They were mainly large city oriented companies catering to the organized 
sector (trade and industry). They were of different sizes, operating at 
different levels of sophistication. They were assigned to four different 
subsidiaries (roughly of equal size) of the General Insurance Corporation. 
The General Insurance Corporation was incorporated as a holding company 
in November 1972 and it commenced business on January 1, 1973. It had 
four subsidiaries were: (1) the National Insurance Company, (2) the New 
India Assurance Company, (3) the Oriental Insurance Company, and (4) the 
United India Insurance Company with head offices in Calcutta (now 
Kolkata), Bombay (now Mumbai), New Delhi, and Madras (now Chennai) 
respectively. Collectively these subsidiaries are known as the NOUN for 
their initials.  
 
There were several goals of setting up this structure. First, the subsidiary 
companies were expected to “set up standards of conduct and sound 
practices in the general insurance business and rendering efficient customer 
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service.” (General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972). Second, 
the General Insurance Corporation was to help with “controlling their 
expenses”. Third, it was to help with the investment of funds. Fourth, it was 
to bring in general insurance in the rural areas of the country. Fifth, the 
General Insurance Corporation was also designated the National Reinsurer. 
By law, all domestic insurers were to cede 20% of the gross direct premium 
in India to the General Insurance Corporation under the Section 101A of the 
Insurance Act of 1938. The idea was to retain as much risk as possible 
domestically. This was in turn motivated by the desire to minimize the 
expenditure on foreign exchange. Sixth, all the four subsidiaries were 
supposed to compete with one another.  
 
With the hindsight of thirty years of experience, we can examine the degree 
of success of each goal above. It was noted by the Malhotra Committee that 
the “behavior of the general insurance employees were not customer 
friendly” (Malhotra, 1994, Chapter II, Section 2.22, p. 15). Thus, the goal of 
“efficient customer service” remained elusive. Cost cutting seemed to have 
worked between 1973 and 1980. The cost of operation (as a percent of 
premium income fell from around 30% in 1973 to around 24% in 1980 
(Malhotra, 1994, Appendix IX, p. 131). Thereafter, there had not been a 
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huge change in cost of operation. For investment funds, it was again noted 
that funds of the General Insurance Corporation had very low rates of return  
“…general insurance companies have been far too conservative in managing 
their equity portfolios” (Malhotra, 1994, Chapter VI, Section 6.9, p. 47). For 
rural expansion, the subsidiaries introduced a number of schemes such as 
crop insurance, cattle insurance and the like. They also tried to stimulate 
rural business by raising the commissions of the rural agents. Unfortunately, 
the companies did not make much headway in any direction for expanding 
rural business. With respect to reinsurance, the General Insurance 
Corporation did retain a large amount of reinsurance domestically in some 
areas of general insurance (such as motor insurance). Finally, the 
competition among the subsidiaries of the General Insurance Corporation 
remained elusive. Effectively they acted like a cartel – carving up the market 
into their own regional territories and acting like monopolies. 
 
2.8 Investment Regimes: Before and After 
Nationalization.  
 
The Insurance Act of 1938 required that the life insurance companies should 
hold 55% of their assets in government securities or other approved 
securities (Section 27A of the Insurance Act). In the 1940s, many insurance 
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companies were part of financial conglomerates. With a 45% balance to play 
with, some insurance companies used these funds for their other enterprises 
or even for speculation. A committee headed by Cowasji Jehangir was set up 
in 1948 to examine these practices. The committee recommended the 
following amendments to the Insurance Act. Life insurance companies 
should invest 25% of their assets in government securities. Another 25% 
should go into government securities or other approved securities. Another 
35% should go into approved investment that might include stocks and 
bonds of publicly traded companies. But, they should be blue chip 
companies. Only 15% could be invested in other areas if the Board of 
Directors of the insurance company approved them.  
In 1958, Section 27A of the Insurance Act was modified to stipulate the 
following investment regime:  
(a)  Central Government market securities of not less than 20%  
(b)  Loans to National Housing Bank including (a) above should be no 
less than 25%  
(c)  In State Government securities including (b) above should be no less 
than 50%  
  
Page  78  
  
(d)  In socially oriented sectors including public sector, cooperative sector, 
house building by policyholders, own-your-own-home schemes 
including (c) above should be no less than 75%.  
 
How did the investment regime actually operate on the ground? The figures 
as presented by the Life Insurance Corporation are reproduced in Table 2.4 
Broadly, the first item of “Loans to State and Central Government and their 
Corporations and Boards” has steadily fallen from 42% to around 18% in 
twenty years. In their place, in the category of “Central Government, State 
Government, and Local Government Securities,” the proportion of the 
portfolio has gone up steadily from 57% in 1980 to 80% in 2000. In fact, the 
Life Insurance Corporation (along with the State Bank of India) has become 
one of the two largest owners of government bonds in India.  
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Table 2.4 
Investment Portfolio of the 
Life Insurance Corporation 1980-2000 
 
Year Loans to Govt. 
Government 
bonds 
Special 
Central 
Govt. 
Unapproved Foreign Total 
1980-81 41.7% 55.0% 1.6% 1.1% 0.6% 100.0% 
1981-82 41.1% 54.1% 3.2% 1.0% 0.5% 100.0% 
1982-83 40.3% 54.2% 4.0% 1.0% 0.5% 100.0% 
1983-84 39.1% 54.5% 4.9% 1.1% 0.5% 100.0% 
1984-85 37.7% 55.1% 5.7% 1.1% 0.5% 100.0% 
1985-86 36.5% 55.6% 6.3% 1.1% 0.5% 100.0% 
1986-87 35.0% 56.8% 6.6% 1.0% 0.6% 100.0% 
1987-88 34.1% 57.8% 6.7% 0.8% 0.6% 100.0% 
1988-89 33.2% 58.5% 6.7% 1.0% 0.6% 100.0% 
1989-90 33.1% 58.8% 6.4% 1.2% 0.5% 100.0% 
1990-91 33.6% 59.2% 5.6% 1.1% 0.5% 100.0% 
1991-92 4.9% 85.5% 6.9% 1.9% 0.8% 100.0% 
1992-93 34.1% 60.1% 4.2% 1.1% 0.5% 100.0% 
1993-94 31.4% 63.4% 3.6% 1.1% 0.5% 100.0% 
1994-95 28.7% 66.4% 3.3% 1.1% 0.6% 100.0% 
1995-96 26.5% 69.0% 2.9% 1.2% 0.5% 100.0% 
1996-97 24.8% 71.2% 2.6% 0.9% 0.5% 100.0% 
1997-98 23.1% 73.3% 2.4% 0.8% 0.4% 100.0% 
1998-99 21.7% 75.4% 1.8% 0.8% 0.3% 100.0% 
1999-00 19.8% 77.9% 1.4% 0.6% 0.3% 100.0% 
2000-01 18.3% 79.8% 1.1% 0.5% 0.3% 100.0% 
Notes:  Data up to 1987 are as at end-December and for the remaining years data are as at end-March. * 
denotes figures for 15 months (January 1, 1988 – March 31, 1989).  
Source:  General Insurance Corporation, Annual Reports, various years.  
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2.9 Life Insurance Business during the Nationalized 
Era. 
 
Indian life insurance was nationalized in 1956. All life companies were 
merged together to form one single company: the Life Insurance 
Corporation. By 2000, Life Insurance Corporation had 100 divisional offices 
in seven zones with 2048 branches. There were over 680,000 active agents 
across India with a total of 117,000 employees in the Life Insurance 
Corporation employed directly.  
There are two problems with this type of examination of the industry. First, 
the population of India has grown from 413 million in 1957 to over 1,000 
million in 2000. Therefore, we would expect growth in life policies sold by 
the growth of the population alone. Second, if we measure growth in life 
insurance in nominal amount, for a country like India, where the annual 
inflation rate has averaged 7.8% a year between 1957 and 2002, we would 
0.00%
20.00%
40.00%
60.00%
80.00%
100.00%
120.00%
19
80
-8
1
19
81
-8
2
19
82
-8
3
19
83
-8
4
19
84
-8
5
19
85
-8
6
19
86
-8
7
19
87
-8
8
19
88
-8
9
19
89
-9
0
19
90
-9
1
19
91
-9
2
19
92
-9
3
19
93
-9
4
19
94
-9
5
19
95
-9
6
19
96
-9
7
19
97
-9
8
19
98
-9
9
19
99
-0
0
20
00
-0
1
Loans to Govt.
Government bonds
Special Central Govt.
Unapproved
Foreign
Total
  
Page  81  
  
expected a growth in the sale of life insurance by the sheer force of inflation. 
Therefore, in our discussion, we will not indulge in such descriptions.  
The largest segment of the life insurance market in India has been individual 
life insurance. The types of the policies sold were mainly whole life, 
endowment and “money back” policies. Money back policies return a 
fraction of the nominal value of the premium paid by the policyholder at the 
termination of the contract. Until recently, term life policies were not 
available in the Indian market. The number of new policies sold each year 
went from about 0.95 million a year in 1957 to around 22.49 million in 
2001. The total number of policies in force went from 5.42 million in 1957 
to 125.79 million in 2001. Thus, on both counts there has been a 25-fold 
increase in the number of policies sold. Of course, during the same period, 
the population has grown from 413 million in 1957 to over 1,033 million in 
2001. On a per capita basis, there were 0.0023 new policies per capita in 
1957 compared with 0.0218 new policies in 2001. Total policies per capita 
went from 0.0131 in 1957 to 0.1218 in 2001. Thus, whether we examine the 
new policies sold or the total number of policies in force, there has been a 
tenfold increase during that period. Therefore, if we examine the headcount 
of policies as an indication of penetration, there has been a substantial rise. 
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A part of this rise is directly attributable to a deliberate policy of rural 
expansion of the Life Insurance Corporation.  
In Table 2.5, we lay out the details of different components of life insurance 
business during the nationalized era. Between 1985 and 2001, total life 
business has grown from below 18 billion rupees to over 500 billion rupees. 
During that period, the price index has grown fourfold. Thus, if there were 
no change in life insurance bought in real terms, it would have accounted for 
78 billion rupees worth of business. Note that even in 2001, individual life 
business accounts for 92% of all life insurance market. 
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Table 2.5 
Life Insurance in India, 1985-2004, in millions of US dollars 
 
Year Total Individual Individual pension Group 
Group 
superannuation 
1985 1439.00 1305.60 0.61 133.40 36.64 
1986 1655.73 1497.10 1.25 158.63 39.17 
1987 2056.14 1815.95 10.01 240.19 49.58 
1988 2459.19 2212.68 99.02 246.52 64.73 
1989 2759.06 2483.13 131.33 275.92 62.91 
1990 3189.71 2878.51 147.06 311.19 63.70 
1991 3049.37 2749.45 131.26 299.92 65.79 
1992 2822.35 2564.42 26.69 257.93 65.62 
1993 3096.56 2817.43 18.40 279.12 75.13 
1994 3654.18 3324.75 16.40 329.43 92.69 
1995 4354.21 3743.76 13.46 610.45 341.76 
1996 4583.93 4124.49 41.28 459.43 173.72 
1997 5299.35 4731.80 39.57 567.54 253.84 
1998 5535.60 4946.75 54.57 588.85 240.12 
1999 6436.30 5811.79 121.93 631.62 255.69 
2000 7810.76 6529.91 64.32 701.47 286.18 
2001 10649.33 9771.61 611.52 877.71 430.00 
2002 12216.81 10268.03 593.23 913.71 441.84 
2003 14938.63 12534.63 789.79 1079.23 534.98 
2004 17496.40 14662.19 981.96 1230.37 621.88 
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Life Insurance in India, 1985-2004, in millions of US dollars 
 
 
 
 
A similar story emerges when we examine the saving through insurance 
companies as a component of financial saving. This is revealed in Table 2.6. 
Over a period of ten years between 1991 and 2000, the amount of financial 
saving as a percent of GDP has varied from around 11% to 14.4%. Two 
components of this financial saving, life insurance saving and pension 
saving have increased steadily over the years.  
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Table 2.6 
Components of Financial Saving as a Percent of GDP 
 
Year 1991 1992 1995 1999 2000 
Financial Saving 11.0% 11.0% 14.4% 12.5% 12.1% 
Currency 1.2% 1.3% 1.6% 1.2% 1.1% 
Bank deposits 3.7% 3.2% 6.5% 5.2% 4.5% 
Stocks 1.6% 2.6% 1.7% 0.4% 0.8% 
Claims on 
government 1.5% 0.8% 1.3% 1.6% 1.5% 
Insurance funds 1.0% 1.1% 1.1% 1.3% 1.5% 
Pension funds 2.1% 2.0% 2.1% 2.6% 2.8% 
 
Components of Financial Saving as a Percent of GDP 
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Table 2.7 
General Insurance in India, 1988-2004, in millions of 
US dollars 
Year Total Fire Marine Misc. 
Net 
claims 
incurred 
Profit/ Loss 
before tax 
Assets/Liabilities, 
book value 
1988 1689.86 418.63 323.09 890.86 1205.47 243.53 3394.75 
1989 1405.55 363.23 258.24 732.63 927.02 229.12 3442.44 
1990 1665.52 390.68 291.25 930.65 1085.25 275.30 3819.73 
1991 1542.67 369.44 279.08 818.27 1014.09 294.45 3637.74 
1992 1445.42 350.85 273.86 741.76 1008.24 276.78 3548.54 
1993 1523.30 371.97 266.03 805.69 974.82 345.67 3657.56 
1994 1679.26 421.38 263.43 918.89 1366.52 160.08 4425.58 
1995 1967.12 486.61 296.51 1105.98 1365.52 256.45 5089.42 
1996 2069.25 506.70 278.91 1214.22 1437.51 307.49 5282.34 
1997 2223.15 549.13 290.02 1384.05 1546.49 446.41 5931.26 
1998 2214.10 527.76 247.78 1438.56 1561.97 354.69 5937.43 
1999 2314.44 558.75 237.49 1518.20 1758.78 267.24 6473.50 
2000 2410.90 492.19 227.22 1691.50 1985.70 163.21 6894.47 
2001 2609.08 618.66 225.60 1764.80 1686.05 95.54 7182.36 
2002 2879.83 682.87 249.01 1947.94 1861.02 105.45 7927.70 
2003 3484.58 826.26 301.30 2356.99 2251.83 127.59 9592.47 
2004 4118.68 976.62 356.12 2785.90 2661.60 150.81 11338.04 
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General Insurance in India, 1988-2004,  
in millions of US dollars 
 
 
The management of these companies negotiated a “voluntary retirement 
scheme” to reduce the level of staffing. In February 2004, this was 
implemented. Of the total 80,000 employees in the four companies, the 
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employees. Around 12,000 Development Officers were kept out of the 
voluntary retirement scheme scheme. Of the total staff, 8,500 opted for the 
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of clerical workers has strongly opposed a similar plan for the Life Insurance 
Corporation (Swain, 2004).  
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2.10 Introduction of the New Legal Structure  
After the report of the Malhotra Committee came out, changes in the 
insurance industry appeared imminent. Unfortunately, instability of the 
Central Government in power slowed down the process. The dramatic 
climax came in 1999. On March 16, 1999, the Indian Cabinet approved an 
Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) Bill designed to liberalize the 
insurance sector. The government fell in April 1999 just on the eve of the 
passage of the Bill. The deregulation was put on hold once again.  
An election was held in late 1999. A new government came to power. On 
December 7, 1999, the new government passed the Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Authority Act. This Act repealed the monopoly conferred 
to the Life Insurance Corporation in 1956 and to the General Insurance 
Corporation in 1972. The authority created by the Act is now called the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority. New licenses are being 
given to private companies. The Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority has separated out life, non-life and reinsurance insurance 
businesses. Therefore, a company has to have separate licenses for each line 
of business. Each license has its own capital requirements (around USD24 
million for life or non-life and USD48 million for reinsurance).  
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2.11 Features of the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Act.  
The Insurance Regulatory and Development Act of 1999 was set out as 
follows. “To provide for the establishment of an Authority to protect the 
interests of holders of insurance policies, to regulate, promote and ensure 
orderly growth of the insurance industry and for matters connected therewith 
or incidental thereto and further to amdend the Insurance Act, 1938, the Life 
Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 and the General Insurance Business 
(Nationalisation) Act, 1972.”  
The Act effectively reinstituted the Insurance Act of 1938 with (marginal) 
modifications. Whatever was not explicitly mentioned in the 1999 Act 
referred back to the 1938 Act.  
(1)  It specified the creation and functioning of an Insurance Advisory 
Committee that sets out rules and regulation.  
(2)  It stipulates the role of the “Appointed Actuary”. He/she has to be a 
Fellow of the Actuarial Society of India. For life insurers the 
Appointed Actuary has to be an internal company employee, but he or 
she may be an external consultant if the company happens to be a 
non-life insurance company. The Appointed Actuary would be 
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responsible for reporting to the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority a detailed account of the company.  
(3)  Under the “Actuarial Report and Abstract”, pricing of products have 
to be given in detail. It also requires details of the basic assumptions 
for valuation. There are prescribed forms that have to be filled out by 
the Appointed Actuary including specific formulas for calculating 
solvency ratios.  
(4)  It stipulates the requirements for an agent. For example, insurance 
agents should have at least a high school diploma along with training 
of 100 hours from a recognized institution.  
(5)  Under “Assets, Liabilities, and Solvency Margin of Insurers”, the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority has set up strict 
guidelines on asset and liability management of the insurance 
companies along with solvency margin requirements. Initial margins 
are set high (compared with developed countries). The margins vary 
with the lines of business.  
Life insurers have to observe the solvency ratio, defined as the ratio of 
the amount of available solvency margin to the amount of required 
solvency margin: (a) the required solvency margin is based on 
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mathematical reserves and sum at risk, and the assets of the 
policyholders’ fund; (b) the available solvency margin is the excess of 
the value of assets over the value of life insurance liabilities and other 
liabilities of policyholders’ and shareholders’ funds.  
For general insurers, this is the higher of RSM-1 or RSM-2, where 
RSM-1 is based on 20% of the higher of (i) gross premiums 
multiplied by a factor A, or (ii) net premiums; RSM-2 is based on 
30% of the higher of (i) gross net incurred claims multiplied by a 
factor B, or (ii) net incurred claims (The factors A and B are listed in 
Appendix 2).  
(6)  It sets the reinsurance requirement for (general) insurance business. 
For all general insurance, a compulsory cession of 20% regardless of 
line of business to the General Insurance Corporation, the designated 
national reinsurer was stipulated.  
(7)  Under the “Registration of Indian Insurance Companies”, it sets out 
details of registration of an insurance company along with renewal 
requirements. For renewal, it stipulates a fee of one-fifth of one 
percent of total gross premium written direct by an insurer in India 
during the financial year preceding the year. It seeks to give detailed 
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background for each of the following key personnel: Chief Executive, 
Chief Marketing Officer, Appointed Actuary, Chief Investment 
Officer, Chief of Internal Audit and Chief Finance Officer. Details of 
sales force, activities in rural business and projected values of each 
line of business are also required.  
(8)  Under “Insurance Advertisements and Disclosure”, details of 
insurance advertisement in physical and electronic media has to be 
detailed with the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority. 
The advertisements have to comply with the regulation prescribed in 
section 41 of the Insurance Act, 1938. The Act of 1938 says, “No 
person shall allow or offer to allow, either directly or indirectly, as an 
inducement to any person to take out or renew or continue an 
insurance in respect of any kind of risk relating to lives or property in 
India, any rebate of the whole or part of the commission payable or 
any rebate of the premium shown on the policy, nor shall any person 
taking out or renewing or continuing a policy accept any rebate, 
except such rebate as may be allowed in accordance with the 
published prospectus or tables of the insurer.”  
(9)  All insurers are required to provide some coverage for the rural sector. 
It is called the “Obligations of Insurers to Rural Social Sectors”  
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2.12 Current Business Environment  
The Indian insurance industry is currently valued at Rs. 180000 crores 
($400 billion) and gross premium collection contributes to roughly 2% of the 
GDP. The life insurance sector premiums grew at a rate of 41% in the last 
fiscal (2005-06) to Rs. 35896 crores1. Within the sector, Life Insurance 
Corporation of India continues to be the market leader with the highest 
premiums collected in FY 06 to the tune of Rs. 25645 crores. LIC is 
followed by Bajaj Allianz with an 8% market share, ICICI Prudential with a 
7.4%, HDFC Standard with a 3% and SBI Life with a market share of 2.5% . 
The private players have a long way to go before they can challenge the 
largest player in the industry with only single digit market shares to boast of. 
However with almost 30% share of the industry taken away from this eternal 
player in a small period of 6 years, LIC has strived towards strengthening its 
foothold by bringing in innovative products and services upbeat with the 
new kids on the block. LIC has thus managed to increase its premium 
income consistently over the past years although its market share has 
continued to slide downwards. 
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2.13 Market Driven Factors 
The role of insurance is undergoing a phenomenal change today as is 
evident from the product bouquet and the product advertisements. The 
emphasis lies on insuring oneself and one’s close family members for self-
reliance more-so because nuclear families are the emerging trend in the 
country today. To meet the varying needs of various individuals, the 
insurance players have a vast foray of products in their bouquet. Besides 
this, almost all companies offer the flexibility to customers to choose the 
most suitable product for themselves by combining features of a number of 
products together. Thus the products can be customized to suit the customer 
as per their needs. 
With this flexibility, comes the cost of comparing all the products 
(with their riders) across the companies before judiciously investing in one 
of them. 
To reach out to the consumers, the companies in the industry today 
have widened their distribution channels by approaching prospective 
customers through agents, brokers and bancassurance . With Information 
Technology revolutionizing the financial sector, another channel has been 
made available for selling which is the internet. ICICI Prudential offers 
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Instainsurance through which a client can chose an insurance policy in mere 
10 minutes. Similarly other players have also been pushing their products 
through the internet. 
2.14 Regulation Driven Factors 
The industry is now open to private players under the Government 
mandate of a minimum capital requirement of Rs.100 crores, of which a 
maximum of 26% stake can be held by a foreign partner as equity. For 
license renewal, each company is required to file an application to IRDA on 
an annual basis accompanied with a payment fee of 50000/- for each class of 
insurance business and 20% of the total gross premium written by the 
insurer in the previous year of operation in India or Rs. 5 crores whichever is 
less. 
IRDA also holds the right to cancel the license of any insurance company if 
it feels that the company or insurer fails to conduct its business in a manner 
prejudicial to the interests of the policyholders. To prevent any accidental or 
uninformed decisions in such circumstances, IRDA appoints an enquiry 
officer who looks further into the matter before any verdict is taken. So far 
no life insurance company has been challenged by the authority for violating 
any of the norms. By not passing the verdict before validating, the 
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Government has tried to keep the interests of the players in mind along with 
the consumers. IRDA also clearly explains the reasons under which alicense 
can be cancelled. This transparency in the regulatory body proceedings helps 
to allay the fears of any private enterprise subjected to Government 
regulations. 
The insurance players today are expected to invest the funds judiciously with 
the combined objectives of liquidity, maximization of yield and safety by 
conferring to the Authority’s guidelines on investments. An investment 
policy has to be submitted to the Authority by an insurer before the start of 
an accounting year to efficient resource allocation. 
With moderate entry barriers prevalent in the industry and minimal 
Government interference possible, more industrialists and public sector 
banks are planning to jump into this sector. Also with the recent growth in 
the per capita income of the country and people becoming more aware of the 
need for insurance as a protection and investment tool, the sector promises 
excellent returns for the incumbent 16 players and prospective entrants. 
2.15 Impact of Governmental Reforms of 2000 
The Government having tried various models for the insurance industry such 
as privatization with negligible regulation (pre 1956) and nationalization 
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(1956-2000) and having observed suboptimal performance of the sector, 
resorted to adopting a hybrid model of both these, resulting in privatization 
of the sector with an efficient regulatory mechanism (post 2000). 
This was initiated with the aim of making the industry competitive so that 
there are more players offering a greater variety of products over a larger 
section of the population.  
 
2.16 Distribution channels.  
The Life Insurance Corporation has traditionally sold life business using tied 
agents (in-house sales forces are not a traditional feature of the Indian life 
market). All life insurers have tied agents working on a commission basis 
only, and the majority of private-sector insurers have followed this approach 
in distributing life products. Nevertheless, as banks are now able to sell 
insurance products, bancassurance has made a major impact in life sales. 
Almost all private sector insurers have formed alliances with banks, with a 
few of the insurers using bancassurance as their major source of new 
business. For example, in 2003, SBI Life and Aviva Life sold more than half 
of their policies through banks. Private insurers are selling more than 30% of 
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their policies through the banking channel (in 2004). In India, banks are 
being used only as a channel of distribution because current law prohibits 
bank employees from accepting commission for selling insurance policies.  
2.17 Reinsurance.  
In reinsurance business, Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
(General Insurance - Reinsurance) Regulations, 2000, stipulated the 
following:  
“The Reinsurance Program shall continue to be guided by the following 
objectives to: (a) maximize retention within the country; (b) develop 
adequate capacity; (c) secure the best possible protection for the 
reinsurance costs incurred; (d) simplify the administration of business.”  
For life reinsurance, the Government has allowed private reinsurance 
companies to operate in exactly the same way it has allowed private life 
insurance companies. A foreign reinsurer is allowed to have up to 26% share 
in a life reinsurance company. However, until the end of 2003, there has 
been no taker of this offer. No private reinsurance company has stepped 
forward. The reason is easy to see. For most reinsurers, the main business is 
(still) general reinsurance. To get an idea, if we look at the OECD countries, 
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we observe that around 95% of life insurance risk is retained domestically. 
For general insurance, however, the average risk retained is around 85% 
(OECD, 2003).  
2.18  Market Share.  
In life insurance, we get an indication of where the market is 
heading by examining the new business written during eleven 
months of the fiscal year of 2003 (April 2003-February 2004). 
The distribution of premium is given in Table 2.8. The Life 
Insurance Corporation has slightly over 87% of the market 
share, leaving the rest for the twelve private companies. Among 
the private companies, ICICI-Prudential has the biggest market 
share at 4.43%, followed by Birla Sun Life at 1.90%. Tata AIG 
and HDFC Standard Chartered are the only two other 
companies with more than 1% market share.  
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Table 2.8 
 
Market share for premiums: life market 
(March 2003-February 2004) 
 
Company  Market share (%)  
Public Sector  87.22 
Life Insurance Corporation of India  87.22 
Private Sector  12.78 
Allianz Bajaj Life Insurance Company 
Limited  
0.87 
ING Vyasa Life Insurance Company Limited  0.35 
AMP Sanmar Assurance Company Limited  0.16 
SBI Life Insurance Company Limited  0.89 
TATA AIG Life Insurance Company Limited  1.10 
HDFC Standard Life Insurance Co. Limited  1.15 
ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Limited  4.43 
Aviva  0.46 
Birla Sun-Life Insurance Company Limited  1.90 
OM Kotak Mahindra Life Insurance Co. Ltd.  0.53 
Max New York Life Insurance Co. Limited  0.81 
MetLife Insurance Company Limited  0.14 
Source: IRDA Journal, April 2004, p. 38-39.  
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Market share for premiums: life market 
(March 2003-February 2004) 
 
 
The market share for each company for general insurance 
companies is given in Table 2.9. Public sector companies have 
close to 86% of the premium and the rest is with the private 
sector companies. Once again, ICICI-Lombard has the biggest 
market share among the private companies. Bajaj-Allianz 
comes next with 2.95% of the market share. Tata-AIG has a 
market share of 2.25% and IFFCO-Tokio has 1.97%. The rest 
of the market is shared by others. 
 
 
 
 
Market share (%) 
Life Insurance 
Corporation of India 
Private Sector 
Allianz Bajaj Life 
Insurance Company 
Limited 
ING Vyasa Life Insurance 
Company Limited 
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Table 2.9 
 
Gross Premium Underwritten by General Insurance 
Companies (April 2003-February 2004) 
 
Company Market share (%) 
Public Sector 85.79 
National Insurance Company Limited 21.39 
New India Assurance Company Limited 24.22 
Oriental Insurance Company Limited 18.13 
United India Insurance Company Limited 19.38 
Private Sector 14.21 
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. 
Limited 2.95 
ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. 3.16 
IFFCO-Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. 1.97 
Reliance General Insurance Co. Limited 1.07 
Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. 
Ltd. 1.58 
TATA AIG General Insurance Co. Limited 2.25 
Cholamandalam General Insurance Co. Ltd. 0.57 
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 2.66 
HDFC Chubb General Insurance Co. Ltd. 0.66 
 
  
Page  104  
  
 
 
 
Gross Premium Underwritten by General Insurance Companies (April 2003-February 
2004)
Public Sector 
National Insurance Company Limited 
New India Assurance Company Limited 
Oriental Insurance Company Limited 
United India Insurance Company Limited 
Private Sector 
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. 
Limited 
ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. 
IFFCO-Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. 
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 Table 2.10 
 
Investment Regulation of Life Business 
Type of Investment  Percentage  
I  Government Securities  25%,  
II  Government Securities or other 
approved securities (including (I) 
above)  
Not less than 
50%,  
III  Approved Investments as specified in Schedule I  
Infrastructure and Social Sector  
Explanation: For the purpose of this requirement, 
Infrastructure and Social Sector shall have the 
meaning as given in regulation 2(h) of Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority 
(Registration of Indian Insurance Companies) 
Regulations, 2000 and as defined in the Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority 
(Obligations of Insurers to Rural and Social Sector) 
Regulations, 2000 respectively  
Not less than 15%  
Others to be governed by Exposure/ Prudential 
Norms specified in Regulation 5  
Not exceeding 20%  
IV  Other than in Approved Investments to be 
governed by Exposure/ Prudential Norms 
specified in Regulation 5  
Not exceeding 
15%  
Source: Gazette of India Extraordinary Part III Section 4. Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Authority (Investment) Regulations, 2000 
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Are there any differences in the investment regime of the public 
and the private sector? Recent figures for investment regimes 
across different companies both in the life insurance sector and 
the general insurance sector show the following (Rao, 2003).  
The Life Insurance Corporation has 64% invested in 
Government securities and other approved securities. For the 
private sector as a whole, the corresponding figure is 60%. It 
ranges from 54% (ICICI Prudential) to 70% (AMP Sanmar). 
Infrastructure investment for the Life Insurance Corporation 
was 14% and 16% for the private companies as a group. It 
ranges from a high of 20% for AMP Sanmar and Allianz Bajaj 
to a low of 0% for Aviva. Since Aviva started its operation 
relatively recently, the figure is somewhat unusual. In the 
“other approved” investment category, the Life Insurance 
Corporation has invested 22%. The average for the private 
sector in this category is 19%. In the unapproved category, the 
Life Insurance Corporation has no investment at all whereas in 
the private sector 5% of the total is in this category. OM Kotak 
leads this category with 13%. Most of the other companies have 
no investment in this area.  
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In the general insurance sector, public sector companies 
invested 35% in government securities whereas the private 
sector has 41% in that category. For the public sector 
companies, it ranges from a low of 29% by the Oriental 
Insurance Company to a high of 42% by the National Insurance 
Company. For the private sector it varies from a low of 35% by 
Tata AIG and 50% by IFFCO Tokio. The other big category is 
a catchall “other investments.” In that category, the public 
sector has 49% whereas the private sector only has 39% 
2.19  Insurance in the Rural Sector 
There are two types of obligations of all insurance companies. 
Rural sector and Social sector obligations. The requirements are 
different for life and general business. The requirements also 
differ depending on the number of years in business. Data for 
the private life insurance companies show that on the average, 
13% of private life insurance policies have been sold in the 
rural sector. Among the life insurers, there is a great variation. 
The new entrant – Aviva – virtually did not sell any whereas 
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ING Vyasa sold almost 35% of their policies in the rural areas 
during the fiscal year 2002-2003. Surprisingly, very few of the 
agents of ING Vyasa are rural. Similarly MetLife sold 26% of 
their policies in the rural areas. Very few of their agents are 
rural (Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
Annual Report, 2002-2003, Appendix III). These companies 
sold a few large group policies to agribusiness. Through these, 
they qualified for being “rural” as the locations of these large 
businesses are in rural areas. For private general insurance 
companies, 3.9% of all policies sold were rural. The highest 
proportions are for Bajaj-Allianz and IFFCO-Tokio with 5.87% 
and 5.42% respectively. These figures are surprising as these 
companies have very few rural agents. The average for public 
insurance companies is 6.4% (figures are for April 2002-March 
2003).  
2.20  Price Dispersion of Life Insurance Products.  
Life insurance products like Whole Life or Endowment or 
Money Back policies have two components: saving and 
security. Specifically, there is an element that pays even when a 
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policyholder survives the duration the policy is in force. 
Therefore, the “price” or the premium obscures the protection 
element offered by such policies. Hence, it is somewhat 
difficult to compare such products. Many insurance products 
have additional benefits (called riders). For example, buying 
bags of fertilizer in villages might include one-year term life 
benefits. Thus, if a product also riders, it becomes even more 
difficult to value them because of the embedded options.  
The simplest product to compare across sellers is term life. It 
only has one element. It pays the beneficiary in case the buyer 
dies within a specific time period. When the Life Insurance 
Corporation was a monopoly, there was nothing else to 
compare its term life policy with. Now, the buyer has an array 
of options. How do they compare? This question has been 
investigated by Rajagopalan (2004). It compares policies of 5, 
10, 15, 20 and 25 years for a 30 year old ordinary male for the 
Life Insurance Corporation, HDFC, ICICI Prudential, Tata-
AIG, Allianz Bajaj, Birla Sunlife and Max New York with a 
sum assured of 100,000. The first striking observation is that 
ratio of the maximum and the minimum premium is 2.16 for 
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five year term and 2.60 for the thirty year term. Therefore, the 
dispersion in price is strikingly high for very similar products. 
The degree of price dispersion might be expected to decline as 
the market matures. The second striking feature is that it is not 
the same company that quotes a consistently low price but the 
same company (Tata-AIG) quotes the consistently highest 
price. There is some problem with comparability here as Tata-
AIG quotes are for a 35 year old rather than a 30 year old. The 
results are quite similar for a sum assured of 500,000. 
2.21 Future Prospects: Market Size.  
At the end of 2002, the size of the Indian market (in terms of premium 
volume) was slightly bigger than that of Sweden and 20% smaller 
than that of Ireland (Sigma, 2003). So, why would foreign insurance 
companies be interested in the India market? The answer, of course, is 
that the growth potential of the Indian market is much higher over the 
coming decades.  
Although many commentators have written about India’s growth 
potential, actual estimates of where the Indian GDP will be over the 
next decades have come only very recently. One is by Wilson and 
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Purushothaman (2003) and the other is by Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2004). There are two critical ingredients in our approach. First, we 
need to understand the factors contributing to economic growth in 
India. Second, we need to understand how the economic growth will 
influence saving rate in general and saving in the form of insurance in 
particular.  
Growth accounting  Wilson and Purushothaman (2003) posit a 
model to posit a long term economic growth rate of 6% per annum. 
However, their model is virtually driven by demographics. Rodrik and 
Subramanian (2004), on the other hand, show that India has had 
sustained growth in labor productivity, with a very low variation. In 
addition, the proportion of people who are economically dependent on 
others in the labor force (called dependency ratio) will decline from 
0.68 in 2000 to 0.48 in 2025. This alone will increase the saving rate 
from current 25% of GDP to 39% of GDP. Just these factors of 
productivity growth and favorable demographics alone will produce 
an aggregate growth rate of around 7% a year. There is also evidence 
that the total factor productivity in India is below 60% to 70% below 
where it should be. Institutional reforms (a stable democratic polity, 
reasonable rule of law and protection of property rights) needed for 
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the so-called second round of economic growth are already in place. 
Institutional quality not only helps economic growth, it also makes 
economic systems reasonably resistant to economic shocks. 
Moreover, improvement in labor quality due to higher level of 
educational attainment will also contribute to economic growth. 
Conservatively, these factors will contribute 1% of additional growth 
rate to GDP. Overall, therefore, a conservative estimate shows that the 
GDP growth rate can be 8% per year on a sustained basis.  
Insurance sector and economic growth It is well-known that growth in 
income is positively related to demand for insurance. What is the 
exact relationship? This question has to be answered empirically for 
each country. For India, there is a clear nonlinear relationship between 
total saving and life insurance saving. It can be shown that the 
relationship is contemporaneous. In other words, there seems to be 
very little backward and forward linkages: past overall saving does 
not seem to influence future saving in the form of life insurance and 
vice versa.  
From this, we can project forward the demand for life insurance in 
real terms using the economic growth estimate described above. This 
method gives us an estimate of 140 billion US dollars in today’s 
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dollars for life insurance in India in 2020. Similar technique also gives 
us an estimate of general insurance demand in 2020 of 60 billion US 
dollars in today’s dollars. Assuming a retention rate of 95% in the life 
insurance market and a retention rate of 85% in the general insurance 
market (OECD, 2003) we arrive at a reinsurance market of 16 billion 
US dollars in today’s dollars for 2020.  
The projections above completely ignored two important elements of 
the insurance sector: pension and healthcare. Again, if we add 
conservative values (of 3% of GDP each) in each of these markets, 
another 240 billion US dollars will be added to our estimates above. 
Note that these are conservative estimates. Thus, excluding pension 
and health, we have a conservative projection of 180 billion US 
dollars in 2020. If we include  health and pension, the estimate will 
balloon to 440 billion US dollars thus making it as large as the 
Japanese market in 2002.  
How would the life insurance market be divided up between the 
incumbent Life Insurance Corporation and the newcomers? Models of 
market share have shown that in a fast growing market, the first few 
years are critical (see Guerrero and Sinha, 2004). In life insurance, the 
Life Insurance Corporation has two important elements in its favor. 
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(1) The Life Insurance Corporation has a vast distribution network in 
the rural and semi-urban areas. This would be hard to duplicate. One 
potential way to duplicate it would be through bancassurance – selling 
insurance through banks. Some insurance companies have already 
embarked on this road. (2) Since the Life Insurance Corporation 
started with 100% of the market share, it will lose market share 
simply because of expansion of the market itself and less because of 
loss of existing customers. The Life Insurance Corporation is the only 
financial institution in the top 50 trusted brand names in India by a 
survey of the Economic Times newspaper 
(http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/362862.cms). (3) 
As life insurance benefits accrue over time, it becomes more 
expensive to switch - because switching would mean a loss of accrued 
benefits. With the rapid expansion of life insurance, the market share 
of the Life Insurance Corporation could fall below the 50% mark in 
five years time.  
For the general insurance business, private companies would have an 
easier access. Unlike life insurance, it is not expensive to switch 
insurers because most policies are of one year or less. The problem of 
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tariffication makes competitive pricing difficult for the newcomers. In 
addition, reliable data on hazard rates are not available for many risks.  
India is among the important emerging insurance markets in the 
world. Life insurance will grow very rapidly over the next decades in 
India. The major drivers include sound economic fundamentals, a 
rising middle-income class, an improving regulatory framework and 
rising risk awareness. The fundamental regulatory changes in the 
insurance sector in 1999 will be critical for future growth. Despite the 
restriction of 26% on foreign ownership, large foreign insurers have 
entered the Indian market. State-owned insurance companies still have 
dominant market positions. But, this would probably change over the 
next decade. In the life sector, new private insurers are bringing in 
new products to the market. They also have used innovative 
distribution channels to reach a broader range of the population. There 
is huge in the largely undeveloped private pension market. The same 
is true for the health insurance business. The Indian general insurance 
segment is still heavily regulated. Three quarters of premiums are 
generated under the tariff system. Reinsurance in India is mainly 
provided by the General Insurance Corporation of India, which 
receives 20% compulsory cessions from other general insurers. 
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Finally, the rural sector has potential for both life and general 
insurance. To realize this potential, designing suitable products is 
important. Insurers will need to pay special attention to the 
characteristics of the rural labor force, like the prevalence of irregular 
income streams and preference for simple products.  
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Appendix 1 
The detailed factors are listed below for each major 
line of business 
: Line of business  Factor A Factor B  
Fire 0.5 0.5 
Marine: marine cargo  0.7 0.7  
Marine: marine hull  0.5 0.5  
Miscellaneous:  
Motor  0.85 0.85  
Engineering  0.5 0.5  
Aviation  0.9 0.9  
Liability  0.85 0.85  
Rural insurance  0.5 0.5  
Other  0.7 0.07  
Health  0.85 0.85  
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Appendix 2 
 
List of Insurance/Reinsurance companies in India 
(December 31, 2003) 
LIFE INSURERS  
• Public Sector: Life Insurance Corporation of India  
• Private Sector:  
Allianz Bajaj Life Insurance Company Limited, Birla Sun-Life Insurance 
Company Limited, HDFC Standard Life Insurance Co. Limited, ICICI 
Prudential Life Insurance Co. Limited, ING Vysya Life Insurance Company 
Limited, Max New York Life Insurance Co. Limited, MetLife Insurance 
Company Limited, Om Kotak Mahindra Life Insurance Co. Ltd., SBI Life 
Insurance Company Limited, TATA AIG Life Insurance Company Limited, 
AMP Sanmar Assurance Company Limited, Dabur CGU Life Insurance Co. 
Pvt. Limited  
 
GENERAL INSURERS  
• Public Sector:  
National Insurance Company Limited, New India Assurance Company 
Limited, Oriental Insurance Company Limited, United India Insurance 
Company Limited  
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• Private Sector:  
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Limited, ICICI Lombard General 
Insurance Co. Ltd., IFFCO-Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd., Reliance 
General Insurance Co. Limited, Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. 
Ltd., TATA AIG General Insurance Co. Limited, Cholamandalam General 
Insurance Co. Ltd., Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, HDFC Chubb 
General Insurance Co. Ltd.  
REINSURER   
General Insurance Corporation of India 
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CHAPTER – III 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
 
The review of literature is aimed to find out the literature work done in 
the area of insurance and with special reference to the financial / 
economic performance of insurance players / companies in market. The 
concept of insurance is an echo of the fear residing in mankind. The 
literature reviewed herein below exhibits and explores various aspects 
regarding life and its insurance, need of it, social safety and feeling of 
safety.  
The insurance market was a monopoly market for Life Insurance 
Corporation of India from the colonial era and the market of insurance 
(general / life) was made free for foreign players with Indian partner to 
enter into in 1990s.  
The market becomes a market with perfect competition. Lionel Robbins 
(1939) of Classical School of thoughts says that a man is a rational man 
taking all decisions rationally and therefore the market and its share 
should be equally distributed amongst players who are playing / taking 
part in insurance market.  But it is observed that Life Insurance 
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Corporation of India (LIC) has remained as main player even after 
liberalization / glocalization (think global act local). The studies / surveys 
carried out in the area of insurance is reviewed here in below: 
 Browne, Carson, and Hoyt, 1999 says that previous academic 
studies and rating organizations generally identify bellwether 
financial variables and characteristics of insolvent insurers, as 
opposed to important economic and market conditions in which 
insurers operate.  
 BarNiv and Hershbarger (1990) found insolvent insurers tend to 
be smaller in size than solvent insurers and changed their product 
mix more. 
 Ambrose and Carroll (1994) found that financial variables 
combined with IRIS ratios in a logistic regression model 
outperformed A. M. Best’s recommendations in distinguishing 
between insurers likely to remain solvent and those insurers likely 
to become insolvent. Combining all three types of predictors into 
one model provided the most accurate classification. 
 Carson and Hoyt (1995) found that surplus and leverage 
measures are strong indicators of insurer financial strength, and 
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also found a slightly higher risk of failure among stock insurers 
than mutual insurers. 
 Carson and Scott (1996) examined the “run on the bank” risk, and 
found that prior to 1992 rating organizations generally did not 
appreciate the risks inherent in liabilities such as guaranteed 
investment contracts. 
 Cummins et al. (1999) showed that cash flow simulation variables 
add explanatory power to solvency prediction models. 
 A. M. Best (1992) found that the number of insolvencies is 
correlated with the accident and health underwriting cycle (lagged 
one to three years). The increased number of insolvencies also is 
correlated with increases in interest rates and the life-health 
insurance industry’s focus on investment-related products. The 
Best study did not examine the various economic factors in a 
multivariate framework, thus precluding the ability to identify the 
relative significance of the individual factors. 
 Prior studies of insurance company financial operations, including 
those by Outreville (1990), Cummins (1991), Browne and Hoyt 
(1995), Grace and Hotchkiss (1995), and Hodes et al. (1999) 
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suggest that economic factors are significantly related to insurer 
financial performance. 
 Browne et al. (1999) provided empirical evidence that life insurer 
insolvency was significantly related to several exogenous 
economic and market factors. The data and relatively long time 
period examined by Browne et al. (1999), quarterly data for 1972 
to 1994, provides a more robust testing of the relevant economic 
and market variables than would be possible using shorter periods 
for which insurer-specific annual data are readily available. The 
combination of using this validated set of economic and market 
variables with the insurer-specific data (discussed below) provides 
a more rigorous evaluation of the relevant economic factors in a 
dynamic modelling framework. 
 Berger (1995) investigated the impact of capital asset ratio on 
return on equity. He concluded that capital asset ratio has a 
positive relationship with profitability.  
 Anghazo (1997) examined the impact of firm level characteristics 
on US bank net interest margin. The results documented that bank 
interest margin positively related with leverage, opportunity cost, 
default risk and management efficiency.  
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 Neeley and Wheelock (1997) explored the determinants of 
profitability of commercial banks and find that profitability 
positively related with changes in per capita income. 
 To investigate the performance of banks, Ben Naceur and Goaied 
(2001) used the sample of Tunisian banks over the period of 1980 
to 1995. They advocated that the banks who tried to maintain their 
high deposits and improve their capital and labour productivity are 
performed well.  
 Guru et al. (2002) examined the determinants of performance of 
Malaysian banks over the 10 years period from 1986 to 1995. For 
this purpose, they selected both micro and macro level 
characteristics. The results revealed that inflation positively while 
efficient expense management and high interest rate negatively 
related with profitability. The results of Goddard et al. (2004) 
showed that Profit is an important prerequisite for future growth of 
banks and the banks that maintain a high capital assets ratio tend to 
grow slowly. 
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 A study conducted by the Sufian, F. et al (2009) to investigate the 
determinants of profitability by selecting the non-commercial 
banks financial institutions. The findings indicated that credit risk 
and loan intensity negatively related with profitability while large 
size and financial institutions with high operational expenses 
tended to high profitability ratio.  
 Hakim and Neaime (2005) observed that liquidity, current capital 
and investment are the important determinants of banks 
profitability.  
 Aburime, U. (2006) identified the firm level determinants of 
profitability of Nigerian banks over the five years period from 
2000 to 2004. He concluded that credit portfolio, size, capital size 
and ownership concentration are important determinants of 
Nigerian banks.  
 Kosmidou (2008) showed that money supply growth has 
insignificant impact on profitability while GDP and stock market 
capitalization to assets are significant and have negative relation 
with the ROA.  
 Samitas and Papadogonas (2009) illustrated that firms 
profitability is positively affected by size, sales growth and 
  
Page  130  
  
investment. On the other hand, leverage and current assets 
negatively related with profitability. Several studies also have been 
conducted to measure the performance of the insurance companies 
 
 Sloan, A and Conover, J.(1998) deduced that functional status of 
insurers do not affect the profitability of being insured but public 
coverage have significant impact on profitability of insurance 
companies.  
 Chen and Wong (2004) examined that size, investment, liquidity 
are the important determinants of financial health of insurance 
companies.  
 Chen et al. (2009) examined the determinants of profitability and 
the results showed that profitability of insurance companies 
decreased with the increase in equity ratio. In addition, insurance 
companies must have to diversify their investment and use 
effective hedging techniques which help them to create better 
financial revenues. 
 Uninsured risk leaves poor households vulnerable to serious or 
even catastrophic losses from negative shocks. It also forces them 
to undertake costly strategies to manage their incomes and assets in 
the face of risk, lowering mean incomes earned. Welfare costs due 
  
Page  131  
  
to shocks and foregone profitable opportunities have been found to 
be substantial, contributing to persistent poverty (Morduch, 1990; 
Dercon, 1996, 2004; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Elbers 
et al., 2007, Pan, 2008).  
 Micro insurance has the potential to reduce these welfare costs. By 
offering a payout when an insured loss occurs, it avoids other 
costly ways of coping with the shock leaving future income 
earning opportunities intact. Furthermore, the security linked to 
being insured can be expected to allow the avoidance of costly 
risk-management strategies with positive impacts on poverty 
reduction.  
 Health insurance is more complicated. The impact of health 
insurance is most appropriately assessed in terms of health, but this 
is directly dependent on the strength and weaknesses of the health 
care provision, and not just the financial side of the insurance 
scheme. For example, factors such as the structure of health service 
delivery system, its financing, monitoring and regulation play a 
crucial role in determining health insurance performance (Preker, 
2007). 
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Table 3.1 
 
Cost of Risk: A Review 
 Much research on the effectiveness of these strategies is still taking place, 
documenting and analysing different rather sophisticated mechanisms 
used in poor societies around the world. But the key finding seems to 
stand: they provide some protection against risk and shocks; however, 
this protection is never more than partial, and considerable risks remain 
(Morduch, 1999).  
 
 In short, this literature clearly opens the door for a policy focus: how to 
design better protection schemes, as informal mechanisms are not 
offering perfect protection. 
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This framework also allows us to emphasise that costs are not just 
incurred in the short run, via fluctuations in welfare outcomes. Risk 
coping strategies come at a cost, as assets are depleted when trying to 
cope with risk. Examples are sales of livestock during crises, going with 
less food, potentially affecting long-term health and nutrition, not least of 
children, or withdrawing children from school affecting long-term human 
capital.  
 
Furthermore, ex-ante strategies can be very costly, for example limiting 
the use of modern inputs or in general holding less than efficient asset 
portfolios or just less accumulation of assets (Elbers, Gunning and 
Kinsey, 2007; Dercon and Christiaensen, 2007). The result is that risk 
can be a cause of persistent poverty, with consequences not just limited 
to temporary welfare costs. 
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Table 3.2 
 
An Overview of Key Micro Insurance Impact 
Evaluations on Client 
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 Young et al. (2006) highlight the lack of even a standard framework in 
which to measure the impact of micro insurance, as well as difficulties 
with measuring its impact. 
 Jowett et al. (2003) find that social cohesion and informal financial networks 
are negatively associated with insurance uptake, suggesting that the former 
crowd out public voluntary health insurance.  
 Dercon and Krishnan (2003) present evidence that suggests a crowding out 
effect of informal risk-sharing arrangements by food aid. While the evidence 
base is limited, micro insurance can also have important externalities at the 
community level. For example, health  insurance can produce positive 
information externalities through improved preventive behaviour so that also 
individuals who are not insured benefit from it. On the other hand, Morduch 
(2006) points towards a possible negative price effect of insurance during 
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times of shocks when insured individuals drive up the price of goods, for 
example food. 
UNDERSTANDING DEMAND FOR INSURANCE 
 
 Cohen and Sebstad (2006) highlight the need to carefully study clients’ 
insurance needs before introducing a new product, where market research 
can include studying (i) clients’ needs, (ii) specific products, or (iii) the 
size of the potential market5.  
 There seems to be general agreement about the most important product 
attributes of micro insurance products from a client perspective: simple, 
  
Page  137  
  
affordable and valuable (Churchill, 2006; Leftley and Mapfumo, 2006; 
McCord, 2008)  
 
 These factors are determinants of uptake and therefore determine the 
impact of micro insurance as well. An often identified constraint in 
selling insurance to poor households is a lack of understanding of 
insurance products (McCord, 2001a) 
 
 More educated households have been found to be the ones who are more 
likely to take up insurance (Chankova et al., 2008; Gine et al., 2007b) 
 
 Dror et al. (2007) study households’ willingness to pay, analyzing data 
from a bidding game conducted in more than 3000 households in India. 
They find a higher level of nominal willingness to pay compared to 
previous studies; further, they show that household income and nominal 
willingness to pay are positively correlated, while household income and 
willingness to pay as a percentage of household income is negatively 
correlated. Further, their results suggest that household size is the most 
important determinant of willingness to pay levels. 
 
 Willingness to pay could also be enhanced by simplifying premium 
collection methods and making premiums payable in higher frequencies 
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could be helpful in promoting enrolment by low-income households 
(Chankova, 2008). Paying premiums should be in line with households’ 
cash flows (Cohen and Sebstad, 2006). 
 
 Leftley and Roth (2006) discuss alternative institutional approaches, including 
the use of a protected cell company, alternative administrative procedures such 
as amended agency agreements, or outsourcing to third party administrators, as 
well as alternative distribution channels, such as retailers, workers’ unions, cell 
phone companies, or burial societies and ROSCAs. 
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CHAPTER – IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction : 
The Insurance segment in India governed by Insurance Act, 1938, the Life 
Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 and General Insurance Business 
(Nationalisation) Act, 1972, Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority (IRDA) Act, 1999 and other related Acts. Today Insurance 
business stands as a business growing at the rate of 15-20 per cent annually. 
Together with banking services, Insurance sector adds about 7 per cent to the 
country’s GDP . 
 
In spite of all this growth the statistics of the penetration of the insurance in 
the country is very poor. Nearly 80% of Indian populations are without 
Life insurance cover and the Health insurance. 
“Malhotra Committee” was constituted by the government in 1993 to 
examine the various aspects of the industry. The key element of the reform 
process was Participation of overseas insurance companies with 26% capital. 
Creating a more efficient and competitive financial system suitable for the 
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requirements of the economy was the main idea behind this reform. The 
present study aims to find out the profitability of Life Insurance Corporation 
(The public venture) in pre and post liberalization era. 
4.2 Review of Literature : 
R. Rajendran* and B. Natarajan(2010),in his paper on The impact of 
liberalization, privatization, and globalization (LPG) on life insurance 
corporation of India (LIC)” found that . It was found that the business in 
India and the business outside India as well as the total businesses of LIC are 
always in an increasing trend. 
 
Krishna Goyal (2006)  in his article on “ Impact of Globalization on 
Developing Countries (With Special Reference To India)” published in 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics  says that The 
lesson of recent experience is that a country must carefully choose a 
combination of policies that best enables it to take the opportunity - while 
avoiding the pitfalls.  
 
Dileep Mavalankar  & Ramesh Bhat (November 2000)  in his monograph 
on   Health Insurance in India : Opportunities, Challenges and Concerns 
states that India spends about 6% of GDP on health expenditure. Private 
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health care expenditure is 75% or 4.25% of GDP and most of the rest 
(1.75%) is government funding.  
United Nations in book on Trade and development aspects of insurance 
services and regulatory frameworks noted that As one of the key pillars of 
the financial services sector the insurance sector is a central element of the 
trade and development matrix. It is also stated that There are today in India a 
million insurance agents and another 200,000 employees. 
According to a NIA-CII survey, there are 45 lakh people employed by the 
insurance sector in India (directly/ or through agencies), 27 lakh additional 
manpower is projected by 2012, whereas there exists only 5 lakh manpower 
supply possibility by 2012. 
 
The Sappington-Stiglitz theorem (1987) shows that conditions under 
which privatization could fully implement public objectives of equity and 
efficiency are extremely restrictive. 
Megginson et al (1994) compared the pre- and post- privatization financial 
and operating performance of 61 companies from 18 countries and 32 
industries during the period 1961 to 1990. They found increases in 
profitability, efficiency, capital spending, employment (which they admit is 
a surprising result) and real sales after divestiture. 
 
  
Page  160  
  
4.3 The Title of the Research Problem : 
A STUDY OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
APPRAISAL OF LIFE INSURANCE 
CORPORATION OF INDIA 
 
4.4 Research Problem : 
An attempt is made in the present research to address a basic problem: 
Whether there is any change in profitability of Life Insurance 
Corporation due to liberalization policy of government? 
4.5 Hypothesis : 
In the present context, it is hypothesized in the present study that: 
[1] LIC in India is profitable compared to the private sector 
Test:  The above hypothesis is generally based on a comparison of 
profitability of the LIC in the aggregate with that in the private sector. 
Such comparisons often do not control for factors such as size, 
industrial sector, etc. We will test the hypothesis, controlling for such 
factors, for the period since economic liberalization began (1991- 99), 
for a comparable period before liberalization, and for the two periods 
combined as well. 
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[2] LIC is efficient compared to the private sector 
Test: We will compare measures of efficiency in the public and 
private sectors. This comparison will again be made for the pre- 
and post- liberalization periods. 
[3] Privatization has improved profitability, efficiency, employment, 
capital spending, output and net taxes in the privatized firms 
Test:  As this hypothesis mentions the efficiency of private sector we 
will compare the market share of Life Insurance Corporation of 
India and Private Sector.  
4.6 Sources of Data : 
The study has taken illustrations / case studies /examples wherever 
applicable from national and international basis whereas the secondary data 
is taken from LIC on national basis and the data collection is done for one 
decade pre and post liberalization. As the present study draws information 
from the published reference material, data made available from the annual 
reports available from Life Insurance Corporation Website for ten years 
before liberalization and ten years after liberalization in order to get rational 
comparison with the facts and figures related to financial performance of 
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Life Insurance Corporation in India with reference to performance and 
efficiency. 
4.7 Method of Data Collection : 
As the study is based secondary data and is empirical in nature, the data is 
collected through websites, books, periodicals, journals, LIC Annual Reports 
and the same is analysed with statistical tools. 
4.8 Chapter Plan : 
The study is cauterized as follows: 
Chapter 1:  Insurance Industry Overview 
Chapter 2 :  LIC : Pre & Post Liberalization 
Chapter 3:  Review of Literature 
Chapter 4 :  Research Methodology 
Chapter 5 :  Secondary Data 
Chapter 6:  Findings 
4.9 Significance of the Study : 
Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) being a public sector player has 
an eminent place in the livelihood of Indians. The research on profitability 
and efficiency of LIC definitely will be able to provide guidance to 
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investors, senior citizens, and common man on what to do and what not to 
with biggest insurance player. This study will be a trend setter in the 
insurance studies and will be eye opener for policy manager and policy 
formulators.  
4.10 Limitations of the Study : 
As this study deals with financial aspect and not with other aspects like 
agent premium, policy payout time, approachability to LIC and other 
relevant aspect, this study can be generalized after doing proper 
investigation on related aspects. 
  
Page  164  
  
4.11 References :    
 Adams, Christopher, Cavendish, William, and Mistry, Percy, 
Adjusting Privatization:Case Studies From Developing Countries, 
James Curry, London, 1992. 
 Bhaskar, V. (1992), “Privatization and the developing countries: the 
issues and the evidence Discussion Paper No.47, Geneva: UNCTAD. 
 Bishop, Mathew R., and John A. Kay, 1989, Privatization in the 
United Kingdom: Lessons from experience, World Development, 643-
657. 
 Boardman, A and A. Vining (1989), “Ownership and performance in 
competitive environments: a comparison of the performance of private 
mixed and state-owned enterprises”, Journal of Law and Economics, 
32, April. 
 Bourbakri, Narjess and Jean-Claude Cosset (1997), “The Financial 
and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: Evidence from 
Developing Countries,” mimeo 
 Caves, D., and Christensen, L., “The Relative Efficiency of Public 
and Private Firms in a Competitive Environment: the Case of Canadian 
Railroads,” Journal of Political Economy, 1980. 
  
Page  165  
  
 Annual Reports of LIC (from 1999 – 2007). Insurance Principles and 
Practice by M.N. Mishra – S Chand Publishers – 2008 Edition. 
 Rao CS (2007). “The Regulatory Challenges Ahead” J. Insurance 
Chronicle 7: 10 
 Jain AK (2004). J. Insurance Inst. India 30: 53. 
 Peter D (1999). “Innovate or Die”, J. Economist. 1(2): 41-55. 
 Rao TSR (2000). “The Indian Insurance Industry the Road Ahead” J. 
Insurance Chronicle 3(I): 31. 
 Sabera K (2007). Changes in insurance sector (A Study on Public 
Awareness). “J. Insurance Chronicle 7(1): 37. 
 Sukla AK (2006). The impact of LPG on life insurance. J. Insurance 
Inst. India 32: 10 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Page  166  
  
CHAPTER – V 
ANALYSIS OF SECONDARY DATA 
 
5.1  LIFE INSURANCE: AT A GLANCE 
Life insurance in the modem form was first set up in India through a British 
company called the Oriental Life Insurance Company in 1818, followed by 
the Bombay Assurance Company in 1823 and the Madras Equitable Life 
Insurance Society in 1829. All of these companies operated in India but did 
not insure the lives of Indians. They insured the lives of Europeans living in 
India. 256  
The first general insurance company, Triton Insurance Company Ltd., was 
established in 1850. It was owned and operated by the British. The first 
indigenous general insurance company was the Indian Mercantile Insurance 
Company Limited, established in Bombay in 1907.  
 
256 An excellent history of Indian business can be found in Tripathi (2004). It gives a detailed account of 
the rise of business houses in India during the colonial period.  
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Foreign insurers were doing well during that period. In 1938, the average 
size of the policy sold by Indian companies had fallen to U.S. $532 
(compared to $619 in 1928), and that of foreign companies had risen 
somewhat to $1,188 (in 1928, the average size was $1,150) 
By 1956, there were 154 Indian life insurers. There were 16 non-Indian 
insurers, and 75 provident societies were issuing life insurance policies. 
Most of these policies were centered in the big cities of Bombay, Calcutta, 
Delhi, and Madras.  
5.2  Development of Insurance after Independence: 
1956 to 2000  
5.2.1  Need for Nationalization  
After India became independent in 1947, a National Planning 
initiative modeled after the Soviet Union's was implemented. 
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's vision was to have key 
industries under direct government control to facilitate the 
implementation of National Planning. Insurance business (or, 
for that matter, any financial service) was not seen to be of 
strategic importance.  
257 I am indebted to Professor Alan Hasten of the University of Pennsylvania for 
drawing my attention to this document.  
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Malaviya's argument for the high cost of Indian insurance is the 
only one that he backed up with data (his other claims were 
made in vague terms), so we can take a closer look at his 
evidence on this point. Based on some data, he presents what he 
called "overall expenses" of insurance business operation in 
India, the United States, and the United Kingdom. His 
calculations are shown in Table 2.2. He found that it costs 
Indian insurers 27 to 28 percent of premium income for 
insuring lives, whereas in the United States, the corresponding 
figure is 16 to 17 percent. In the United Kingdom, it is even 
lower at 13 to 14 percent. On the face of it, this argument seems 
watertight. Unfortunately, this is not the case. On closer 
inspection of how the numbers were arrived at, we find that for 
the calculation, the denominator used for India is not the same 
as that used for the United States and the United Kingdom. For 
the Indian data, the denominator uses premium income only, 
whereas, for the other two countries, the denominator uses total 
income that includes premium income and investment income 
(as is customary the world over).  
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The finance minister addressed the question of why general 
insurance was not being nationalized in 1956 in his speech as 
follows.  
Thus, he did not deem general insurance to be "vitally needed 
for economic development." The only way this view could be 
justified is if we view insurance as a vehicle for long-term 
investment and if we ignore the elimination of uncertainty 
through insurance as a relatively minor benefit. After all, 
general insurance reduces uncertainty for the non-life category 
the same way insurance reduces uncertainty for life.  
In India today more than half of the population live in rural 
areas and contribute a quarter of the gross domestic product 
(GDP). Thus, the policymakers felt that it was essential to bring 
life insurance business to the rural population. Did the 
policymakers succeed in bringing insurance in the rural sector? 
Exactly to whom in the rural sector did they manage to bring 
life insurance?  
 
 
The "success" of the rural expansion can be measured in a 
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number of different dimensions. Here we are not talking about 
success necessarily in the sense of commercial success of 
higher profits. The finance minister was talking about a social 
objective of bringing insurance cover for the "neglected" rural 
areas. After all, if profits were to be made in rural insurance, the 
private sector would not have neglected rural areas. Therefore, 
we will measure success in terms of the penetration of life 
insurance into rural areas.  
First, we examine the penetration of life insurance in terms of 
individual policies. The earliest figure we have is for 1961. 
Around 36 percent of all the individual life policies sold were in 
the rural sector. This proportion fell to 29 percent by 1970. 
Then, from 1980, the proportion started to climb. It climbed 
steadily for a decade, and, between 1995 and 1999, it climbed 
even faster with fully 57 percent of all policies sold being in the 
rural sector. This increase between 1980 and 1999 is 
remarkable for two reasons. First, the proportion of people 
living in rural areas has been falling steadily since 1950. 
Second, the fall in the proportion had not only halted since 
1980 but it had been reversed. Thus, there is no question that 
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the Life Insurance Corporation, through deliberate policy 
change, managed to penetrate the rural market since 1980 in a 
way they could not earlier. Of course, the number of individual 
policies gives us only part of the story.  
Finally, we examine the value of the average individual life 
policy sold in the rural areas as a percent of the average of all 
the individual life policies sold nationwide. In 1961, this 
proportion was 84 percent. It fell almost steadily to 74 percent 
by 1970 and then climbed back to 84 percent in 1990. It has 
hovered around that figure since. If we compare the per capita 
income in the rural areas with the per capita income in the 
urban areas, for almost all states there is a 50 percent 
difference. Specifically, if the average rural income is 100, for 
most states, the average urban income is 150. Therefore, the 
individual life insurance policies in the rural areas are not being 
bought by the average rural households but by the relatively 
wealthy rural households.  
 
These observations about the value of the policies being sold in 
rural areas and the issue of who is buying the policies in rural 
areas raise an uncomfortable question. Has the expansion of the 
Life Insurance Corporation in the rural areas served the rural 
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rich at the high cost of reduced profitability of the company? 
Obviously, this was not the intention when the finance minister 
spoke of serving the neglected rural areas in his speech at the 
eve of nationalizing life insurance in 1956.  
5.2.2  Inception of Tariff Advisory Committee  
In 1968, the Insurance Act of 1938 was amended further. A 
Tariff Advisory Committee replaced the Tariff Committee. The 
Tariff Advisory Committee became a statutory body. Section 
64UC(2) of the Act stated:  
"In fixing, amending or modifying any rates, advantages, 
terms or conditions relating to any risk, the [Tariff] Advisory 
Committee shall try to ensure, as far as possible, that there is 
no unfair discrimination between risks of essentially the same 
hazard, and also that consideration is given to past and 
prospective loss experience: provided that the [Tariff] 
Advisory Committee may, at its discretion, make suitable 
allowances for the degree of credibility to be assigned to the 
past experience including allowances for random fluctuations 
and may also, at its discretion, make suitable allowance for 
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future hazards of conflagration or catastrophe or both."  
 
 
The introduction of the Tariff Advisory Committee was seen as 
an independent, impartial, scientifically driven body for 
ratemaking in general insurance. After the nationalization of 
general insurance in 1972   the Tariff Advisory Committee 
became the servant of the nationalized companies. For example, 
the chairman of the General Insurance Corporation, the holding 
company of four nationalized subsidiaries, also became the 
chairman of the Tariff Advisory Committee. All members of 
the Tariff Advisory Committee were nominated by the General 
Insurance Corporation. It came under heavy criticism from the 
Malhotra Committee. The Report (1994) stated that "the data 
supplied [by the nationalized companies] was often incomplete 
and outdated and, over the years, the system has almost broken 
down" (chap. 5, sect. 5.25, p. 41).  
 
Any move away from a tariffed regime is not always popular. 
What usually follows is rising premiums in some lines. For 
example, in India, motor insurance prices will rise with the 
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removal of tariffs, and this will probably be pinned as a folly of 
privatization. Of course, such premium adjustment has nothing 
to do with privatization per se. Government-owned insurers 
could take a loss in the motor insurance business (as they did 
during the 1990s) and cover the deficit from other lines of 
business. But privately run insurers would seek to generate 
profit from every line of business. As a result, motor insurance 
premiums will rise to cover losses. Similarly, rating systems 
based on drivers' age and experience will be slowly introduced. 
It will be a long process because the new systems require 
individual specific past information that can be gathered cost 
effectively only with computerization of vehicle accident 
information and other risks.  
5.2.3 Investment: Before and After Nationalization 
The Insurance Act of 1938 required that the life insurers should 
hold 55 percent of their assets in government securities or other 
approved securities (Section 27A). In the 1940s, many insurers 
were part of financial conglomerates. With a 45 percent balance 
to play with, some insurers used these funds for their other 
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enterprises or even for speculation. A committee headed by 
Cowasji Jehangir was set up in 1948 to examine these practices. 
The committee recommended the following amendments to the 
Insurance Act: Life insurers should invest 25 percent of their 
assets in government securities; another 25 percent should go 
into government securities or other approved securities; another 
35 percent should go into approved investment that might 
include stocks and bonds of publicly traded companies (but 
they should be blue chip companies); and only 15 percent could 
be invested in other areas if the board of directors of the 
insurance company approved them.  
5.2.4  Life Insurance Business before globalization 
Indian life insurance was nationalized in 1956. All life insurers 
were merged together to form one single company: the Life 
Insurance Corporation. By 2000, the Life Insurance 
Corporation had 100 divisional offices in seven zones with 
2,048 branches. There were over 680,000 active agents across 
India with a total of 117,000 employees in the Life Insurance 
Corporation employed directly.  
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There are two problems with this type of examination of the 
industry. First, the population of India has grown from 413 
million in 1957 to over 1,000 million in 2000. Therefore, we 
would expect growth in life insurance policies sold by the 
growth of the population alone. Second, if we measure growth 
in life insurance in nominal amount, for a country like India, 
where the annual inflation rate has averaged 7.8 percent per 
year between 1957 and 2002, we would expected a growth in 
the sale of life insurance by the sheer force of inflation. 
Therefore, this discussion will not indulge in such descriptions.  
 
The largest segment of the life insurance market in India has 
been individual life insurance. The types of policies sold were 
mainly whole life, endowment, and "money back" policies. 
Money back policies return a fraction of the nominal value of 
the premium paid by the policyholder at the termination of the 
contract. Until recently, term life policies were not available in 
the Indian market. The number of new policies sold each year 
went from about 950,000 per year in 1957 to around 22.49 
million in 2001. The total number of policies in force went 
from 5.42 million in 1957 to 125.79 million in 2001. Thus, on 
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both counts there has been a 25-fold increase in the number of 
policies sold. Of course, during the same period, the population 
has more than doubled. On a per capita basis, there were 0.0023 
new pohcies per capita in 1957 compared with 0.0218 new 
policies in 2001. Total policies per capita went from 0.0131 in 
1957 to 0.1218 in 2001.  
 
Thus, whether we examine the new policies sold or the total 
number of policies in force, there has been a 10-fold increase 
during that period.  
 
Therefore, if we consider the number of individual policies to 
be an indication of penetration, there has been a substantial 
increase, part of which is directly attributable to a deliberate 
policy of rural expansion of the Life Insurance Corporation.  
 
In recent years, life insurance saving has played a bigger role in 
national saving. Table 5.2 plots the nonlinear relationship 
between total national saving and life insurance premium (both 
as percentages of the contemporaneous GDP) for 52 years. At 
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relatively lower levels of saving rate (that correspond to lower 
levels of income), a rise in saving rate does not lead to a rise in 
life insurance premium expressed as a fraction of GDP. In the 
case of India, the threshold value of saving rate seems to be 
around 20 percent beyond that, the life premium as a percent of 
GDP starts to grow rapidly. India has reached that turning point.  
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Table 5.1 
 
Life Insurance—Direct Premiums in Force for Domestic 
Risks—in India,1985 to 2004 (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
 
Year Total Individual Individual 
Pension 
Group Group 
Superannuation 
1985 1,439.00  1,305.60  0.61  133.40  36.64  
1986 1,655.73  1,497.10  1.25  158.63  39.17  
1987 2,056.14  1,815.95  10.01  240.19  49.58  
1988 2,459.19  2,212.68  99.02  246.52  64.73  
1989 2,759.06  2,483.13  131.33  275.92  62.91  
1990 3,189.71  2,878.51  147.06  311.19  63.70  
1991 3,049.37  2,749.45  131.26  299.92  65.79  
1992 2,822.35  2,564.42  26.69  257.93  65.62  
1993 3,096.56  2,817.43  18.40  279.12  75.13  
1994 3,654.18  3,324.75  16.40  329.43  92.69  
1995 4,354.21  3,743.76  13.46  610.45  341.76  
1996 4,583.93  4,124.49  41.28  459.43  173.72  
1997 5,299.35  4,731.80  39.57  567.54  253.84  
1998 5,535.60  4,946.75  54.57  588.85  240.12  
1999 6,436.30  5,811.79  121.93  631.62  255.69  
2000 7,810.76  6,529.91  64.32  701.47  286.18  
2001 10,649.33  9,771.61  611.52  877.71  430.00  
2002 12,216.81  10,268.03  593.23  913.71  441.84  
2003 14,938.63  12,534.63  789.79  1,079.23  534.98  
2004a 17,496.40  14,662.19  981.96  1,230.37  621.88  
 
Source: Swiss Reinsurance Company database.  
Note: All figures were converted to U.S. dollars by using the average market exchange rate of the year.  
a 2004 figures are estimates based on the actual results of the first nine months of the year.  
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Table 5.2 
Components of Financial Saving as a Percentage of  
Gross Domestic Product 
 1991 1995 1999 2000 2005 
Financial 
Saving  
11.0  11.0  14.4  12.5  12.1  
Currency  1.2  1.3  1.6  1.2  1.1  
Bank deposits  3.7  3.2  6.5  5.2  4.5  
Stocks  1.6  2.6  1.7  0.4  0.8  
Claims on 
government  
1.5  0.8  1.3  1.6  1.5  
Insurance 
funds  
1.0  1.1  1.1  1.3  1.5  
Pension funds  2.1  2.0  2.1  2.6  2.8  
 
Source: Central Statistical Organization database.  
Note: Each financial year ends March 31.  
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5.2.5 General Insurance: Malhotra Committee 
Report 
During the final years of the General Insurance Corporation as a 
holding company, there were a number of suggestions about 
what to do with the structure of the industry. The Malhotra 
Committee Report (1994) strongly recommended that the 
General Insurance Corporation cease to be the holding company 
and concentrate on reinsurance business only. The four 
subsidiaries should become independent companies. The report 
also noted that the subsidiaries were overstaffed (chap. 12, pp. 
88-89).  
But the Malhotra Report was not the final word. A study 
conducted by the consulting company PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
commissioned by the General Insurance Corporation in 2000, 
recommended just the opposite. It argued that, in the face of 
impending competition from the private companies, the 
subsidiaries should be merged to form a single company to 
better fight the competifion. While these discussions were 
taking place, the four subsidiaries undertook restructuring. The 
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results of this restructuring can be found by looking at the 
efficiency levels of the companies over the 1997to 2003 period.  
Thirty-four percent of the 13,500 officers in the four companies 
opted for the voluntary retirement scheme; only 11 percent of 
the 36,000 clerical staff opted for voluntary retirement. This 
outcome came as a surprise to the management. They were 
hoping to eliminate more clerical jobs through the voluntary 
retirement scheme. The powerful union of clerical workers has 
strongly opposed a similar plan for the Life Insurance 
Corporation (Swain, 2004).  
 
5.2.6 New Legal Structure and Life Insurance in 
India 
After the report of the Malhotra Committee was released, 
changes in the insurance industry appeared imminent. 
Unfortunately, instability of the central government in power 
slowed down the process. The dramatic climax came on March 
16, 1999, when the Indian cabinet approved an Insurance 
Regulatory Authority (IRA) Bill designed to liberalize the 
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insurance sector. The government fell in April 1999 just on the 
eve of the passage of the bill. Deregulation was put on hold 
once again.  
A new government came to power with a late-1999 election, 
and on December 7, 1999, the new government passed the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Act. This 
Act repealed the monopoly conferred to the Life Insurance 
Corporation in 1956 and to the General Insurance Corporation 
in 1972. The authority created by the Act is now called the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority. Under this 
bill, new licenses are being given to private companies. The 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority has separated 
out life, non-life, and reinsurance businesses. Therefore, a 
company must have separate licenses for each line of business.  
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5.2.7 Features of the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Act  
The Insurance Regulatory and Development Act of 1999 set out 
"To provide for the establishment of an Authority to protect the 
interests of holders of insurance policies, to regulate, promote 
and ensure orderly growth of the insurance industry and for 
matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and further to 
amend the Insurance Act, 1938, the Life Insurance Corporation 
Act, 1956 and the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) 
Act, 1972."  
 
The Act effectively reinstituted the Insurance Act of 1938 with 
(marginal) modifications. Whatever was not explicitly 
mentioned in the 1999 Act referred back to the 1938 Act.  
(1) It specified the creation and functioning of an Insurance 
Advisory Committee that sets rules and regulation.  
(2) It stipulates the role of the "appointed actuary." He or she 
must be a fellow of the Actuarial Society of India. For 
life insurers, the appointed actuary must be an internal 
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company employee, but he or she may be an external 
consultant if the company is a non-life insurance 
company. The appointed actuary is responsible for 
reporting to the Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority a detailed account of the company.  
(3) Under the "Actuarial Report and Abstract," pricing of 
products must be given in detail, and details of the basic 
assumptions for valuation are required. There are 
prescribed forms that have to be filled out by the 
appointed actuary, including specific formulas for 
calculating solvency ratios.  
(4)  It stipulates the requirements for an agent—for example, 
insurance agents should have at least a high school 
diploma along with 100 hours of training from a 
recognized institution.  
(5) The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
has set up strict guidelines on asset and liability 
management of the insurance companies along with 
solvency margin requirements. Initial margins are set 
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high (compared with developed countries). The margins 
vary with the lines of business. 
Life insurers are required to observe the solvency ratio, 
defined as the ratio of the amount of available solvency 
margin to the amount of required solvency margin. The 
required solvency margin is based on mathematical 
reserves and sum at risk and the assets of the 
policyholders' fund. The available solvency margin is the 
excess of the value of assets over the value of life 
insurance liabilities and other liabilities of policyholders' 
and shareholders' fiinds. For general insurers, this is the 
higher of RSM-1 or RSM-2, where RSM-1 is based on 
20 percent of the higher of (i) gross premiums multiplied 
by a factor A or (ii) net premiums and RSM-2 is based on 
30 percent of the higher of (i) gross net incurred claims 
multiplied by a  factor B or (ii) net incurred claims 
(factors A and B are listed in Appendix 2). 
(6) It sets the reinsurance requirement for (general) insurance 
business. For all general insurance, a compulsory cession 
of 20 percent was stipulated regardless of line of business 
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to the General Insurance Corporation, the designated 
national reinsurer.  
(7) It sets out details of insurer registration and renewal 
requirements. For renewal, it stipulates a fee of one-fifth 
of one percent of total gross premiums written direct by 
an insurer in India during the preceding financial year . It 
seeks to give detailed background for each of the 
following key personnel: chief executive, chief marketing 
officer, appointed actuary, chief investment officer, chief 
of internal audit, and chief finance officer. Details of the 
sales force, activities in rural business, and projected 
values of each line of business are also required. 
(8) Details of insurance advertisement in physical and 
electronic media must be reported to the Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority. The 
advertisements have to comply with the regulation 
prescribed in section 41 of the Insurance Act of 1938: 
"No person shall allow or offer to allow, either directly or 
indirectly, as an inducement to any person to take out or 
renew or continue an insurance in respect of any kind of 
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risk relating to lives or property in India, any rebate of 
the whole or part of the commission payable or any 
rebate of the premium shown on the policy, nor shall any 
person taking out or renewing or continuing a policy 
accept any rebate, except such rebate as may be allowed 
in accordance with the published prospectus or tables of 
the insurer."  
(9) All insurers are required to provide some coverage for 
the rural sector.260  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
260 The formal definition of "rural sector" is "any place as per the latest census.. 
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5.2.8 Development of Insurance After Liberaliztion 
India’s Life Insurance sector boasts of the second largest 
mobilization of savings after banks and constitutes 15% of GDP 
savings in 2007. The future potential still lies in the rural 
insurance market, because out of 72% of rural population only 
12% has an insurance cover. 
 The factors that support the possibilities for increased 
penetration of the Indian Life Insurance market are the 
emerging socio-economic changes, increased wealth, education 
and awareness of insurance needs. 
 The industry, as such is set to emerge independent of being 
driver merely by tax incentives for growth. 
 LIC had a monopoly in the life insurance business till the 
opening up of the sector in the year 1999-2000 and even after 
that, it remains the largest player in the market. 
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Table 5.3 
(2001-02 to 2007-08)  
Total Life Insurance Premium 
Insurer 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
LIC 49821.91 54628.49 63533.43 75127.29 90792.22 127822.84 149789.99 
Private 272.55 1119.06 3120.33 7727.51 15083.54 28253.00 51561.42 
Total 50094.46 55747.55 66653.75 82854.80 105875.76 156075.84 201351.41 
  
It is observed that the first two year after the liberalisation LIC 
had recorded the growth of 42.79% and 9.65% respectively in the 
collection of total premiums. The growth in the premium collections 
in the subsequent years has also reflected the same trend. 
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Table 5.4 
Market share of Life Insurers in terms of total 
premium under written (2001-02 to 2007-08) 
Insurer 
2001-
02 
2002-
03 
2003-
04 
2004-
05 
2005-
06 
2006-
07 
2007-
08 
LIC 99.46 97.99 95.29 90.67 85.75 81.92 74.39 
Private 0.54 2.01 4.71 9.33 14.25 18.08 25.61 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
 In terms of market share of the Life Insurance during the 
period 2001-02 to 2007-08, the private players increased their 
market share from mere 0.54% in 2001-02 to 25.61% in the year 
2007-08. 
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Table 5.5 
New policies under written by Life Insurers 
No. of policies in lakhs 
Insurer 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
LIC  24545580 26968069 23978123 31590707 38229292 37612599 
Private  825094 1658847 2233075 3871410 7922274 13261558 
Total  25370674 28626916 26211198 35462117 46151566 50874157 
 
 The new policies sold in a financial year under written by the 
industry were 262.11 lakh during 2004-05 showing a decline of 
8.44% against the figures of 2003-04. In the above table new 
policies under written by the industry were 508.74 lakh in 2007-08 
as against 461.52 lakh during 2006-07 showing an increase of 
10.23%. Private insurers exhibited a growth of 67.40%, LIC showed 
a decline of 1.61% as against growth of 21.01% in 2006-07. This 
shows the stiff competition faced by LIC from the private players in 
the Life Insurance market. 
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Table 5.6 
Operation Performance  
              Assets of LIC        (Rs. in crore) 
 
 Year 
Total 
Assets 
Growth Trend 
in % 
Annual 
growth rate 
% 
1999-2000 149654.38 100.00 - 
2000-2001 196342.26 131.19 31.19 
2001-2002 234561.36 156.74 19.46 
2002-2003 290539.96 194.14 23.86 
2003-2004 367359.83 245.48 26.44 
2004-2005 438079.22 292.73 19.25 
2005-2006 552447.33 369.15 16.10 
2006-2007 651882.88 435.60 17.99 
2007-2008 803820.14 537.11 23.30 
1999-2000 is taken as base year for growth trend 
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 The total assets of LIC in 1999-2000 were ` 1,49,654.38 Cr. 
which reached ` 8,03,820.14 Cr. by 2007-08 at an overall growth rate 
of 537.11%. The average annual growth rate of assets of LIC is 20.84%. 
Table 5.7 
Income of LIC (1999-2008) 
                                                      (Rs. in Cr.) 
Year 
Total 
Income 
Total 
out go 
Excess of Income 
over outgo 
1999-2000 44729.61 18101.93 26627.68 
2000-2001 53998.76 22005.26 31993.50 
2001-2002 73780.06 28405.10 45374.96 
2002-2003 80938.48 40836.75 40101.73 
2003-2004 93088.91 44706.17 48382.74 
2004-2005 112346.24 48460.70 63885.54 
2005-2006 132146.88 52251.57 79895.31 
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2006-2007 174424.76 76836.20 97588.56 
2007-2008 206362.98 80176.14 126186.84 
 
 The operational performance of LIC in the year 1999-2000 
reveals that it has increased nearly five times in 2007-08. The total 
income of LIC in the year 1999-2000 was ` 44,729.61 Cr. and total 
outgo of ` 26,627.68 Cr. By the year 2007-08, the total income of 
LIC was ` 2,06,362.98 Cr. and the total outgo was ` 70,176.14 Cr. 
with excess of income over outgo ` 1,26,186.84 Cr. 
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Table 5.8 
Net Profit and growth trend of Net Profit earned 
by LIC 
(1999-00 to 2007-08) 
Year 
Net Profit 
(Rs. in 
Cr.) 
Growth Trend 
Annual 
growth rate 
% 
1999-2000 512.69 100.00 - 
2000-2001 632.15 123.30 23.30 
2001-2002 821.79 160.28 28.57 
2002-2003 496.97 96.96 - 39.52 
2003-2004 551.81 107.63 11.03 
2004-2005 708.37 138.67 28.37 
2005-2006 631.58 123.18 - 10.84 
2006-2007 773.62 150.89 22.48 
2007-2008 844.63 172.54 9.17 
1999-2000 is taken as base year for growth trend 
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 As shown in above table, LIC showed negative growth in profit 
during the year 2002-03 and 2005-06 with a decrease in profit of 
39.52% and 10.84% respectively over the previous years. The net 
profit earned by LIC shows an overall growth of around 175.52% 
from 1999 to 2008. 
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Table 5.9 
Settlement of claims by LIC (1999-00 to 2007-08) 
Year 
Claims intimated Claims settled 
Claims 
outstanding 
Number 
(Lakh) 
Amount 
(`.Cr.) 
Number 
(Lakh) 
Amount 
(`.Cr.) 
Number 
(Lakh) 
Amount 
(`.Cr.) 
1999-
00 
67.79 9669.42 66.19 9266.25 1.60 403.17 
2000-
01 
76.83 12069.99 75.54 11676.57 1.29 432.01 
2001-
02 
88.28 14805.20 87.67 14531.85 0.61 273.35 
2002-
03 
97.13 17253.30 96.91 17061.75 0.22 191.55 
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2003-
04 
103.68 19781.11 103.53 19607.20 0.15 173.91 
2004-
05 
115.68 23832.78 115.04 23642.54 0.17 190.24 
2005-
06 
121.07 28709.43 120.84 28472.99 0.23 236.44 
2006-
07 
135.72 36734.30 135.31 36485.91 0.41 248.39 
2007-
08 
141.13 37374.94 140.95 37019.51 0.18 355.43 
  
As shown in above table the claims settled in terms of number have 
increased substantially from 66.19 lakhs in 1999-2000 to 140.95 
lakhs in 2007-08. Similarly the value of claims have also increased 
from ` 9,266.30 Cr. in 1999-2000 to ` 37,019,51 Cr. in 2007-08. 
The claims outstanding in terms of number of policies have 
increased from ` 0.15 lakh in 2003-04 to ` 0.41 lakh in 2006-07 
and observed a sudden decrease to ` 0.18 lakh in 2007-08. 
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Contrary to this, the claims outstanding in terms of sum assured 
have shown fluctuations and stood at ` 355.43 Cr. in 2008. This 
shows the claim settlement operation of LIC is good, given the huge 
volume of value of its business. 
 
5.2.9 IRDA : Current State of Play & Future 
Prospects  
Starting in early 2000, the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority started granting charters to private life 
and general insurance companies. Appendix 3 lists all 
companies with charters as of December 31, 2003.  
 
By the end of 2003, 13 life insurers had charters to operate—1 
public (the old monopoly) and 12 private companies. All of the 
private companies have foreign partners in life business. 
Almost all the general insurers also have foreign partners. One 
such charter was very special. The State Bank of India (SBI) 
announced a joint venture partnership with Cardif SA of France 
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(the insurance arm of BNP Paribas Bank). Since the SBI is a 
bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) needed to clear the 
participation of the SBI because banks are allowed to enter 
other businesses on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the SBI became 
the test case.  
 
The latest group to receive an outright charter for operating a 
life insurance company is the Sahara Group (on March 5, 
2004). Sahara's entry is notable for two reasons. First, Sahara 
would be the only company to enter the Indian life insurance 
market without a foreign partner, thus becoming the only purely 
domestic company to be granted a license to operate in the 
insurance sector. Second, it operates the largest non-bank 
financial company in India, the first to operate in the life 
insurance sector.  
Thirteen general insurance companies were operating in India at 
the end of 2003. Four are public sector companies—the 
erstwhile subsidiaries of the General Insurance Corporation that 
operated as nationalized companies—and the rest are private 
sector companies.  
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In India, life insurance business in 2002 amounted to U.S. 
$12.2 billion, and non-life insurance business amounted to $3.3 
billion. Thus, the life business is almost four times as large as 
the non-life business. The rate of annual growth in the year 
2001-2002 was 43 percednt in life insurance and 13.6 percent in 
non-life insurance. The total premiums underwritten by the Life 
Insurance Corporation of India was around $11 billion in fiscal 
year 2001-2002. Income of the Life Insurance Corporation 
during the same period was $16 billion. Twelve companies in 
the private sector had foreign company participation up to the 
permissible limit of 26 percent of equity share capital. Over a 
period of 10 years (1991 to 2001), the Life Insurance 
Corporation has averaged a real growth rate of 12 percent.  
 
During the same 2001-2002 period, the gross direct premium 
income of the four public sector companies, the subsidiaries of 
the General Insurance Corporation of India, was U.S. $2.9 
billion. The real growth rate over a period of 10 years (1991 to 
2001) has been 5 percent annually.  
 
The general insurance business includes motor vehicle 
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insurance, marine insurance, fire insurance, personal accident 
insurance, health insurance, aviation insurance, rural insurance, 
and others. At present, the General Insurance Corporation is the 
only reinsurer. Foreign capital of around $140 million has been 
so far invested in the new life insurance companies in India.  
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5.2.10 LIFE INSURANCE & Its Distribution 
Channels  
The Life Insurance Corporation has traditionally sold life 
insurance using tied agents (in-house sales forces are not a 
traditional feature of the Indian life insurance market). All life 
insurers have tied agents working on a commission basis only, 
and the majority of private-sector insurers have followed this 
approach in distributing life insurance products. Nevertheless, 
because banks are now able to sell insurance products, 
bancassurance has made a major impact in life insurance sales. 
Almost all private-sector insurers have formed alliances with 
banks, with a few of the insurers using bancassurance as their 
major source of new business. For example, in 2003, SBI Life 
and Aviva Life sold more than half of their policies through 
banks. In 2004, private insurers sold more than 30 percent of 
their policies through the banking channel. In India, banks are 
used only as a channel of distribution because current law 
prohibits bank employees from accepting commission for 
selling insurance policies.  
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5.2.11 Reinsurance:  
In the reinsurance business, the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority (General Insurance—Reinsurance) 
Regulations, 2000, stipulated the following:  
The Reinsurance Program shall continue to be guided by the 
following objectives to: (a) maximize retention within the 
country; (b) develop adequate capacity; (c) secure the best 
possible protection for the reinsurance costs incurred; (d) 
simplify the administration of business.  
For life reinsurance, the government has allowed private 
reinsurance companies to operate in exactly the same way it has 
allowed private life insurance companies. A foreign reinsurer is 
allowed to have up to 26 percent share in a life reinsurance 
company. However, until the end of 2003, there has been no 
taker of this offer. The reason that no private reinsurance 
company has stepped forward is easy to see. For most 
reinsurers, the main business is (still) general reinsurance. In 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development)-member countries, around 95 percent of life 
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insurance risk is retained domestically. For general insurance, 
however, the average risk retained is around 85 percent (OECD, 
2003).  
5.2.12 LIFE INSURANCE: Market Share of Players 
We can get an indication of where the life insurance market is 
heading by examining the new business written during eleven 
months of the fiscal year of 2003 (April 2003 to February 
2004). The distribution of premiums is shown in Table 5.10. 
The Life Insurance Corporation has slightly over 87 percent of 
the market share, leaving the rest for the twelve private 
companies. Among the private companies, ICICI-Prudential has 
the largest market share at 4.43 percent, followed by Birla Sun 
Life at 1.90 percent. Tata AIG and HDFC Standard Chartered 
are the only two other companies with more than 1 percent 
market share. 
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Table 5.10 
Market Share for Premiums in the  
Indian Life Insurance Market  
 Company Market Share (%) 
Public Sector  87.22  
 Life Insurance Corporation of India  87.22  
Private Sector  12.78  
 Allianz Bajaj Life Insurance Company Limited  0.87  
 ING Vyasa Life Insurance Company Limited  0.35  
 AMP Sanmar Assurance Company Limited  0.16  
 SBI Life Insurance Company Limited  0.89  
 TATA AIG Life Insurance Company Limited  1.10  
 HDFC Standard Life Insurance Co. Limited  1.15  
 ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Limited  4.43  
 Aviva  0.46  
 Birla Sun-Life Insurance Company Limited  1.90  
 OM Kotak Mahindra Life Insurance Co. Ltd.  0.53  
 Max New York Life Insurance Co. Limited  0.81  
 MetLife Insurance Company Limited  0.14  
Source: IRDA Journal, April 2004, pp. 38-39.   
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The market share for general insurance companies is shown in 
Table 5.11. Public-sector companies have close to 86 percent of 
the premiums, and the rest are with private-sector companies. 
Once again, ICICI-Lombard has the largest market share among 
the private companies, Bajaj-AUianz comes next with 2.95 
percent of the market share. Tata-AIG has a market share of 
2.25 percent, and IFFCO-Tokio has 1.97 percent. 
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5.2.13 Investment  in Insurance & Legal Implications 
Investment regimes in insurance in India have always had 
quantitative restrictions. Current legal requirements are 
explained in Table 5.12 for the life insurance business and in 
Table 5.13 for general insurance. At least half of the investment 
has to be either directly in government securities (bonds) or for 
infrastructure investments (which also take the form of 
government bonds). These investment options are "safe" 
because they are fully backed by the government. Of course, 
this also means that they earn the lowest rate of return in the 
Indian market. The government (both at the federal and state 
levels) has used insurance business as a way of raising capital. 
Unfortunately, much of it has been spent on consumption 
expenditure leading to substantial increase in government debt. 
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Table 5.11 
Gross Premiums Underwritten by General Insurers  
(April 2000 to February 2008) 
 
Company Market Share (%) 
Public Sector 85.79 
 
National Insurance Company Limited 21.39 
 
New India Assurance Company Limited 24.22 
 
Oriental Insurance Company Limited 18.13 
 
United India Insurance Company Limited 19.38 
Private Sector 14.21 
 
Bajaj AUianz General Insurance Co. Limited 2.95 
 
ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. 3.16 
 
IFFCO-Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. 1.97 
 
Reliance General Insurance Co. Limited 1.07 
 
Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. 1.58 
 
TATA AIG General Insurance Co. Limited 2.25 
 
Cholamandalam General Insurance Co. Ltd. 0.57 
 
Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 2.66 
 
HDFC Chubb General Insurance Co. Ltd. 0.66 
Source: IRDA Journal, April 2004, p. 40. 
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Table 5.12 
Investment Regulation of Life Insurance Business 
 
  Type of Investment Percentage 
I  Government securities 25% 
II  Government securities or other approved securities (including (I) above) Not less than 50% 
III  Approved investments as specified in Schedule I Not less than 15% 
 Infrastructure and social sector  
 Explanation: For the purpose of this requirement, infrastructure and social 
sector shall have the meaning as given in regulation 2(h) of Insurance 
Regulatory and Development Authority (Registration of Indian Insurance 
Companies) Regulations, 2000, and as defined in the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority (Obligations of Insurers to Rural and Social Sector) 
Regulations, 2000, respectively. Others to be governed by exposure/prudential 
norms specified in Regulation 5  
 
 Others to be governed by exposure/prudential norms specified in Regulation 5  Not exceeding 20% 
IV  Other than in approved investments to be governed by exposure/prudential 
norms specified in Regulation 5 
Not exceeding 15% 
Source: Gazette of India Extraordinary Part III Section 4. Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority 
(Investment) Regulations, 2000. 
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Table 5.13 
Investment Regulation of General Insurance Business 
  Type of Investment Percentage 
I  Central government securities Not less than 20% 
II  State government securities and other guaranteed securities, including 
(i) above 
Not less than 30% 
III  Housing and loans to state government for housing and fire-fighting 
equipment 
Not less than 05% 
IV  Investments in approved investments as specified in Schedule II  
(a) Infrastructure and Social Sector Not less than 10% 
 Explanation: For the purpose of this requirement, infrastructure and 
social sector shall have the meaning as given in regulation 2(h) of 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Registration of 
Indian Insurance Companies) Regulations, 2000, and as defined in the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Obligations of 
Insurers to Rural and Social Sector) Regulations, 2000, respectively. 
 
(b) Others to be governed by exposure/prudential norms specified in 
Regulation 5 
Not exceeding 30% 
V Other than in approved investments to be governed by 
exposure/prudential  
norms specified in Regulation 5 
Not exceeding 25% 
 
Source: Gazette of India Extraordinary Part III Section 4. Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority (Investment) Regulations, 2000. 
The Life Insurance Corporation has 64 percent invested in government securities and 
other approved securities. For the private sector as a whole, the corresponding figure is 
60 percent, ranging from 54 percent (ICICI Prudential) to 70 percent (AMP Sanmar). 
Infrastructure investment for the Life Insurance Corporation was 14 percent and 16 
percent for the private companies as a group, ranging from a high of 20 percent for 
AMP Sanmar and Allianz Bajaj to a low of 0 percent for Aviva.  
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Since Aviva started its operation relatively recently, the figure 
is somewhat unusual. In the "other approved" investment 
category, the Life Insurance Corporation has invested 22 
percent. The average for the private sector in this category is 19 
percent. In the unapproved category, the Life Insurance 
Corporation has no investment at all, whereas in the private 
sector 5 percent of the total is in this category. OM Kotak leads 
this category with 13 percent. Most of the other companies have 
no investment in this area. 
5.2.14 Price Dispersion of Life Insurance Products  
Life insurance products such as whole life or endowment or 
money back policies have two components: saving and security. 
Specifically, there is an element that pays even when a 
policyholder survives the duration the policy is in force. 
Therefore, the "price" or the premium obscures the protection 
element offered by such policies. Hence, it is somewhat 
difficult to compare such products. Many insurance products 
have additional benefits (called riders). For example, buying 
bags of fertilizer in villages might include one-year term life 
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benefits. Thus, if a product also has riders, it becomes even 
more difficult to value it because of the embedded options.  
The simplest product to compare across sellers is term life, 
because it only has one element. It pays the beneficiary in case 
the buyer dies within a specific time period. When the Life 
Insurance Corporation was a monopoly, there was nothing else 
to compare with its term life policy. Now, the buyer has an 
array of options. How do they compare? This question has been 
investigated by Rajagopalan (2004), and the results are reported 
in Table 5.14. The table compares policies of 5, 10, 15, 20, and 
25 years for a 30-year-old ordinary man for the Life Insurance 
Corporation, HDFC, ICICI Prudential, Tata-AIG, Allianz Bajaj, 
Birla Sunlife, and Max New York with a sum assured of 
100,000 rupees. The first striking observation is that ratio of the 
maximum and the minimum premiums is 2.16 for a 5-year term 
and 2.60 for a 30-year term. Therefore, the dispersion in price is 
strikingly high for very similar products. The degree of price 
dispersion might be expected to decline as the market matures. 
The second striking feature is that it is not the same company 
that quotes a consistently low price, but the same company 
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(Tata-AIG) quotes the consistently highest price. There is a 
problem with comparability here, because Tata-AIG quotes are 
for a 35-year-old rather than a 30-year-old. The results are quite 
similar for a sum assured of 500,000 rupees. 
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Table 5.14 
Comparison of Premiums as of October 31, 2002, for Pure Term Insurance for 
Ordinary Males. 
   Insurer   
A
n A
nalysis of the Evolution of Insurance in India 
 LIC HDFC ICICI Prudentiala Tata-AIG Allianz Bajaj Birla Sunlife Max New York   
Age 30 30 30 35 30 30 30   
Sum Assured (in rupees) 5,00,000 5,00,000 5,00,000 5,00,000 5,00,000 5,00,000 5,00,000   
Term (years) Yearly Premium (in rupees)   
5 n.a.   2,455  2,575  1,655  1,875 1,190   
10 1,140   2,504  2,585  1,805  1,875  1,225   
15 1,285  1,510  2,553  3,010  2,050  1,875  1,265   
20 1,528  1,535  2,680  3,450  2,440  1,905  1,375   
25 n.a.   4,160   1,980 1,600   
30 n.a. 1.790        
Sum Assured (in rupees) 1,00,000 1,00,000 1,00,000 1,00,000 1,00,000 1,00,000 1,00,000   
Term (years) Yearly Premium (in rupees) Best Deal Max/Min (Ratio) 
5   245.5 515 331 375 238 238 2.16 
10 228.0  250.4 517 361 375 245 228 2.27 
15 257.0 302 255.3 602 410 375 253 253 2.38 
20 305.6 307 268.0 690 488 381 275 268 2.57 
25    832  396 320 320 2.60 
30  358      358   
Source: R. Rajagopalan (2004). 
Note: For the year 2002 (the year for which the data was taken), the average value of one U.S. dollar was approximately 49 rupees. SBI Life and ING 
Vysya do not offer a pure level term plan. Data are not available on the web sites of Om Kotak Mahindra and ANP Sanmar. 
" The premiums per 100,000 rupees assured is likely to be higher for ICICI Prudential because they are based on the quotes for a sum assured of one million rupees. 
TATA-AIG quotes are for 35-year-old male. Its quotes for a 30-year-old male will be lower. 
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5.2.15 Indian Insurance Market : Future Perspective 
At the end of 2002, the size of the Indian insurance market (in 
terms of premium volume) was slightly bigger than that of 
Sweden and 20 percent smaller than that of Ireland (Sigma, 
2003). So why would foreign insurance companies be interested 
in the Indian market? The answer, of course, is that the growth 
potential of the Indian market is much higher over the coming 
decades. 
Although many commentators have written about India's 
growth potential, actual estimates of where the Indian GDP will 
be over the next decades have come only very recently. One is 
by Wilson and Purushothaman (2003) and the other is by 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2004). There are two critical 
ingredients in our approach. First, we need to understand the 
factors contributing to economic growth in India. Second, we 
need to understand how the economic growth will influence the 
saving rate in general and saving in the form of insurance in 
particular. 
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Growth Accounting 
Wilson and Purushothaman (2003) posit a long-term economic 
growth rate of 6 percent per annum. However, their model is 
virtually driven by demographics. Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2004), on the other hand, show that India has had sustained 
growth in labor productivity, with a very low variation. In 
addition, the proportion of people who are economically 
dependent on others in the labor force (called the dependency 
ratio) will decline from 0.68 in 2000 to 0.48 in 2025. This alone 
will increase the saving rate from current 25 percent of GDP to 
39 percent of GDP. Just these factors of productivity growth 
and favorable demographics alone will produce an aggregate 
growth rate of around 7 percent per year. There is also evidence 
that the total factor productivity in India is below 60 to 70 
percent below where it should be. Institutional reforms (a stable 
democratic polity, reasonable rule of law, and protection of 
property rights) needed for the so-called second round of 
economic growth are already in place. Institutional quality not 
only helps economic growth, it also makes economic systems 
reasonably resistant to economic shocks. Moreover, 
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improvement in labor quality due to higher levels of 
educational attainment will also contribute to economic growth. 
Conservatively, these factors will contribute 1 percent of 
additional growth rate to the GDP. Overall, therefore, a 
conservative estimate shows that the GDP growth rate can be 8 
percent per year on a sustained basis. 
Insurance Sector and Economic Growth 
It is well known that growth in income is positively related to 
demand for insurance. What is the exact relationship? This 
question has to be answered empirically for each country. For 
India, there is a clear nonlinear relationship between total 
saving and life insurance saving. It can be shown that the 
relationship is contemporaneous. In other words, there seems to 
be very few backward and forward linkages: past overall saving 
does not seem to influence future saving in the form of life 
insurance and vice versa. 
From this, we can project forward the demand for life insurance 
in real terms using the economic growth estimate described 
above. This method gives us an estimate of U.S. $140 billion in 
today's dollars for life insurance in India in 2020. A similar 
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technique also gives us an estimate of general insurance 
demand in 2020 of $60 billion in today's dollars. Assuming a 
retention rate of 95 percent in the life insurance market and a 
retention rate of 85 percent in the general insurance market 
(OECD, 2003), we arrive at a reinsurance market of $16 billion 
in today's dollars for 2020. 
These projections completely ignore two important elements of 
the insurance sector: pension and health care. Again, if we add 
conservative values (of 3 percent of GDP each) in each of these 
markets, another $240 billion will be added to the above 
estimates. Excluding pension and health, we have a 
conservative projection of $180 billion in 2020. If we include 
health and pension, the estimate will balloon to $440 billion, 
thus making it as large as the Japanese market in 2002. 
5.2.16 Future Prospects: Market Share 
How will the life insurance market be divided between the 
incumbent Life Insurance Corporation and the newcomers in 
coming years? Models of market share have shown that, in a 
fast-growing market, the first few years are critical (Guerrero 
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and Sinha, 2004). There are three important elements to 
consider when formulating a picture of the future life insurance 
market in India: (1) The Life Insurance Corporation has a vast 
distribution network in the rural and semi-urban areas that 
would be hard to duplicate. One potential way to duplicate this 
reach would be to sell insurance through banks, and some 
insurers have already embarked on this road. (2) Since the Life 
Insurance Corporation started with 100 percent of the market 
share, it will lose market share simply because of expansion of 
the market itself and less because of losing existing customers. 
The Life Insurance Corporation is the only financial institution 
in the top 50 trusted brand names in India by a survey of the 
Economic Times newspaper 
(economictimes.indiatimes.com/article show/362862.cms). (3) 
As life insurance benefits accrue over time, it becomes more 
expensive to switch—because switching means a loss of 
accrued benefits. With the rapid expansion of life insurance, the 
market share of the Life Insurance Corporation could fall below 
the 50 percent mark within five years. 
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For the general insurance business, private companies will have 
easier access to the market. Unlike life insurance, it is not 
expensive to switch insurers because most policies are of one 
year or less. The problem of tariffication makes competitive 
pricing difficult for the newcomers. In addition, reliable data on 
hazard rates are not available for many risks. 
 
5.2.17 FINDINGS 
India is among the important emerging insurance markets in the 
world. Life insurance will grow very rapidly over the next 
decades in India. The major drivers of this growth include 
sound economic fundamentals, a rising middle class, an 
improving regulatory framework, and rising risk awareness. 
The fundamental regulatory changes that occurred in the 
insurance sector in 1999 will be critical for future growth. 
Despite the restriction of 26 percent on foreign ownership, large 
foreign insurers have entered the Indian market. State-owned 
insurers still have dominant market positions, but this will 
probably change over the next decade. In the life sector, new 
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private insurers are bringing new products to the market, and 
they are using innovative distribution channels to reach a 
broader range of the population. There is huge market potential 
in the largely undeveloped private pension market and in the 
health insurance business. The Indian general insurance 
segment is still heavily regulated. Three quarters of premiums 
are generated under the tariff system. Reinsurance in India is 
mainly provided by the General Insurance Corporation of India, 
which receives 20 percent compulsory cessions from other 
general insurers. Finally, the rural sector has potential for both 
life and general insurance. To realize this potential, designing 
suitable products is important. Insurers will need to pay special 
attention to the characteristics of the rural labor force, such as 
the prevalence of irregular income streams and the preference 
for simple products. 
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5.2.19 APPENDIX 1: Definitions of Various Lines of 
Business in the Insurance Act of 1938 
 
Section 2(11), Insurance Act, 1938: "Life Insurance Business" 
means the business of effecting contracts of insurance upon 
human life, including any contract whereby the payment of 
money is assured on death (except death by accident only) and 
the happening of any contingency dependent on human life, and 
any contract which is subject to payment of premiums for a 
term dependent on human life and shall be deemed to include 
(a) the granting of disability and double or triple indemnity 
accident benefits, if so provided in the contract of 
insurance;  
(b) the granting of annuities upon human life; and 
(c) the granting of superannuation allowances and annuities 
payable out of any fund applicable solely to the relief and 
maintenance of persons engaged or who have been 
engaged in any particular profession, trade or 
employment or of the dependents of such persons. 
Section 2(6-A), Insurance Act, 1938: "Fire Insurance Business" 
means the business of effecting, otherwise than incidentally to 
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some other class of insurance business, contracts of insurance 
against loss by or incidental to fire or other occurrence 
customarily included among the risks insured in fire insurance 
policies. 
Section 2(13-A), Insurance Act, 1938: "Marine Insurance 
Business" means the business of effecting contracts of 
insurance upon vessels of any description, including cargoes, 
freights and other interests which may be legally insured, in or 
in relation to such vessels, cargoes and freights, goods, wares, 
merchandise and property of whatever description insured for 
any transit by land or water, or both, and whether or not 
including warehouse risks or similar risks in addition or as 
incidental to such transit, and includes any other risks 
customarily included among the risks insured against in marine 
insurance policies. 
Section 2(13-B), Insurance Act, 1938: "Miscellaneous 
Insurance Business" means the business of effecting contracts 
of insurance which is not principally or wholly of any kind or 
kinds included in Section 2 (6-A), 2 (11) and 2 (13-A) of the 
Insurance Act, 1938. 
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APPENDIX 2: 
Detailed Factors for Each Major Line of  
Insurance Business 
 
 
Line of Business Factor A Factor B 
Fire 0.5 0.5 
Marine: marine cargo 0.7 0.7 
Marine: marine hull 0.5 0.5 
Miscellaneous   
Motor 0.85 0.85 
Engineering 0.5 0.5 
Aviation 0.9 0.9 
Liability 0.85 0.85 
Rural insurance 0.5 0.5 
Other 0.7 0.07 
Health 0.85 0.85 
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APPENDIX 3: 
Insurance/Reinsurance Companies in India  
(December 31, 2003) 
Life Insurers  General Insurers 
Public Sector  Public Sector 
 Life Insurance Corporation of India   National Insurance Company Limited 
Private Sector   New India Assurance Company Limited 
 Allianz Bajaj Life Insurance Company Limited   Oriental Insurance Company Limited 
 Birla Sun-Life Insurance Company Limited   United India Insurance Company Limited 
 HDFC Standard Life Insurance Co. Limited  Private Sector 
 ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Limited   Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Limited 
 ING Vysya Life Insurance Company Limited   ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. 
 Max New York Life Insurance Co. Limited   IFFCO-Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. 
 MetLife Insurance Company Limited   SBI Life Insurance Company Limited 
 Om Kotak Mahindra Life Insurance Co. Ltd.   Reliance General Insurance Co. Limited 
    Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Co. Ltd. 
 TATA AIG Life Insurance Company Limited   TATA AIG General Insurance Co. Limited 
 AMP Sanmar Assurance Company Limited   Cholamandalam General Insurance Co. Ltd. 
 Dabur CGU Life Insurance Co. Pvt. Limited   Export Credit Guarantee Corporation 
    HDFC Chubb General Insurance Co. Ltd. 
Reinsurer 
General Insurance Corporation of India 
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LEXICON 
 Bancassurance. The integration of banking with 
insurance. In India, so far, it has mostly meant selling 
insurance products in banks. Given that bank employees 
are not allowed to accept commissions for selling 
insurance directly, banks have created other indirect 
incentive schemes. 
 General insurance. In India this refers to property-
casualty insurance. This term is used in most 
Commonwealth countries. 
 General Insurance Corporation (GIC). The company 
formed after the nationalization of property-casualty 
insurance business in India in 1972. It formed a 
monopoly. GIC also became the national reinsurer. 
 Insurance Act of 1938. The ftindamental legal basis for 
the Indian insurance industry. The Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Act of 1999 was superimposed on the 
Insurance Act of 1938. 
 Insurance Regulatory and Development Act of 1999. 
This law deregulated insurance  business in India. It 
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allowed for private national company participation and 
limited foreign participation in the Indian insurance 
market. It created the Insurance Regulatory and 
Development Authority as the regulatory body of 
insurance business. 
 Life Insurance Corporation (LIC). The company 
formed after the nationalization of the life insurance 
business in India in 1956. It formed a monopoly. 
 Malhotra Committee Report of 1994. The basis of 
recent regulatory changes under the Insurance Regulatory 
and Development Act of 1999. 
 Nationalization. In India nationalization of the insurance 
industry took place in two stages. Life insurance was 
nationalized in 1956. Property-casualty insurance was 
nationalized in 1972. 
 Rural insurance. In India all insurers must have certain 
proportion of their business conducted in rural India. 
 Tariff Advisory Committee. The price-setter for 
property-casualty business in India. The committee is 
supposed to be phased out in the near future. 
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 Tied agents. Insurance agents who work on a commission 
basis only. Most life insurance companies in India used 
tied agents to distribute life insurance products. 
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CHAPTER – VI 
FINDINGS & SUGGESTION 
 
6.1 FINDINGS 
 AT THE OUTSET, THE RESEARCHER SUBMITS THAT: 
 [1] Table 5.1 advocates the fact that people are aware about life 
insurance and therefore the quantum of coverage for life 
insurance has increased by more than ten times in span of 20 
years. The group insurance and demand for pension increased 
suggest the fear and need of security increasing in working 
people is a different dimension left for psychologist and 
sociologist but increasing need of insurance is due to awareness 
of financial planning and financial budgeting is a sign of good 
and healthy society. 
 [2] Table 5.2 speaks that people are investing in insurance is about 
1.5 percent of Gross Domestic product is 50 % rise as 
compared to investment of 1.0 percent of GDP in 1991. 
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 [3] Table 5.10 speaks that after liberalization and globalization, 
people are still having faith in bricks and mortar system and 
Life Insurance Corporation of India is having 87.22 percent of 
market share in India whereas private sector is having 12.78 
percent share ( which includes 12 major and three minor 
players). 
 [4] In case of General Insurance, table 5.11 clears that public sector 
( 04 companies ) is having 85.79 percent share in market 
whereas private general insurance players is having 14.21 
percent share.  Which speaks that Indian people is having faith 
in government mechanism and at the same time there is less 
acceptability of change. 
 [5] In pre and post liberalization of insurance market, it was 
expected that the monopoly of Life Insurance Corporation of 
India should be removed and the market should behave like 
perfect market situation.  After liberalization, it is felt that the 
people tried other insurance companies and came back to Life 
Insurance Corporation of India because the foreign Indian tie 
ups were not able to handle the volume of business lying in 
Indian market. 
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 [6] The Indian Market of Insurance, versatile in nature, complex in 
terms of habits, customs and routines (Amartya Sen, 
Institutional Economics) could not understand complex terms 
of contract and new methodologies of dealing with insurance, 
unspoken terms and hidden agendas of tie ups and went / turned 
around to vasudhaiv Kutumbakam and the players in the market 
has once again accepted life insurance corporation as a major 
player. 
 [7] It is humbly submitted that the market was captured by the 
foreign companies at the time of their inception in the area 
where LIC was having no plan (Unit Linked Plans) and 
thereafter when LIC introduced such plans with secured bonus 
and guaranteed NAV, it was easy for common man to prefer 
LIC. 
 [8] It is submitted that the pension plan launched by LIC and other 
public pension plans, has taken once again LIC in market as 
market leader. 
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 [9] LIC equipped with new technology and with new young staff 
aging between 35 to 45 average has taken lead to secure India 
in 21st century. 
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6.2 SUGGESTIONS 
 [1] The policy coding (numbering) may be made easy to 
understand. 
 [2] Use of Information technology can me made more efficient 
specially for policy application, issue of policy, paying 
premium and renewal of policy.  
 [3] Policy without agent if implemented, policy could be offered as 
less and competitive premium will help LIC to serve even 
downtrodden people of India. 
 [4] A policy if clubbed in portfolio and if a customer is given a 
customer id having all policies in one portfolio will help in 
getting better tracking. 
 [5] Plans targeting rural people giving policy in regional language 
and giving receipt of premium in regional language will help in 
getting better business. 
 [6] Development of new products will motivate deeper penetration 
of market in middle income sector with significant saving trend.  
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              [7] Reverse Mortgage kind of schemes useful to senior citizens 
may be launched. 
 
 [8] Toll free helpline and customer care units and if possible policy 
trekking system if generated will help customers at one end and 
LIC at another end for better and effective /efficient business. 
   
 
